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ABSTRACT
Cen, Lei PhD, Purdue University, August 2016. A Study of Security Issues of Mobile Apps
in the Android Platform Using Machine Learning Approaches . Major Professors: Luo Si
and Ninghui Li.
Mobile app poses both traditional and new potential threats to system security and user
privacy. There are malicious apps that may do harm to the system, and there are mis-
behaviors of apps, which are reasonable and legal when not abused, yet may lead to real
threats otherwise. Moreover, due to the nature of mobile apps, a running app in mobile
devices may be only part of the software, and the server side behavior is usually not covered
by analysis. Therefore, direct analysis on the app itself may be incomplete and additional
sources of information are needed.
In this dissertation, we discuss how we can apply machine learning techniques in mul-
tiple tasks for security issues in regard of mobile apps in the Android platform. These
include malicious apps detection and security risk estimation of apps. Both direct sources
of information from the developer of apps and indirect sources of information from user
comments are utilized in these tasks. We also propose comparison of these different sources
in the task of security risk estimation to point out the necessity of usage of indirect sources
in mobile app security tasks.
11 INTRODUCTION
There has been a steady rise of smart mobile devices for both personal and business use.
These devices run applications (apps) that have unprecedented access to private informa-
tion, including contacts, emails, geo-location data, personal and business files, and much
more. There is also explicit monetary risk associated with these devices since phone calls,
messages, and data usage can cost money. More directly, these devices often have access
to users’ bank accounts through an application or as a means to authenticate to a bank, and
in the future it seems likely that phones may act as a digital wallet, directly accessing the
bank accounts as part of the functionality. While the existence of this information and ac-
cess creates much of the value found in a smart mobile device, it also makes these devices
attractive targets for malicious entities. Furthermore, the threats casted by the mobile App
security problem present new properties. On one hand, comparing with traditional software
markets, markets like Google Play and Apple Store have lower entry threshold for devel-
opers and faster financial payback, hence greatly encouraging more and more developers
to invest in this thriving business. One result out of this is the huge amount of mobile apps
with great diversity. Therefore controlling the quality of apps, especially the security risk
of them across the whole markets, becomes an important issue to all that involved. On the
other hand, public concerns about privacy issues with on-line activity and mobile phones
are also elevating, demanding a mobile environment with more respect to users’ privacy.
1.1 Security Issues of Mobile apps and Machine Learning
We may investigate the problem of mobile App security from two perspectives, in re-
garding of its properties compared to traditional security problems.
From the Security issue category perspective: One perspective is that the mobile App
security includes both issues which are more common to traditional software security, like
2malicious App classification and permission control etc.; and those which are less common
like advertise abusing, unresolved In-App-Purchase (IAP) etc. While the former are clear
security threats, the later sometimes could only be seen as misbehavior that may lead to
real problems like phishing, fraud, privacy issues etc.
Real Threats Malware (malicious App) detection is an typical task in mobile security.
Many works have been done for this task, including code analysis (static and dy-
namic) permission analysis etc. Please refer to Section 2.2.2 for a more detailed
introduction.
Mis-behaviors Some behaviors are commonly discussed by users due to their potential
of leading to real threats. Advertising abusing in mobile phone may lead to phishing
attack (i.e. from pop-ups), unsolved IAP may be signs of fraud and permission over
requesting may lead to privacy information stealing. These behaviors, though could
be acceptable in many occasions, do cast potential threats and are worried and com-
plained by uses all the time. Therefore, it would be necessary to estimate the security
risk of mobile apps in regard of these misbehaviors.
From the source of analysis perspective: As software running in mobile phone, which
have much limited computation power and display capability, mobile apps usually consist
both the part that runs in mobile phones and the part supporting the functionality via Inter-
net. Therefore the analysis of security issues of a mobile App may consider both part of
it. However, due to the complication of communication between an App and its service, it
would be hard to analyze the outside part directly from the mobile devices. For example,
we may be able to detect an transaction of IAP in a game App, but it would be hard to track
whether the transaction succeed or not. If not, whether it is just a rare bug in the server side
or it is actually a case of fraud. Therefore when we gather source of information for the
analysis, it would be reasonable to include source that reflect the experience of App using
indirectly.
3Direct SourceWe define the direct source of information of a mobile App as those infor-
mation released by the developer of the the App. These include the .apk App file, the
permission requested and App description etc.
Indirect SourceWe define the source of information of a mobile App as those information
that is not from the developer of the App, but from the user of the App. These include
mostly the comments made my the users of the App.
Machine learning technique have been introduced into mobile security by many works [1–
3], and it is very adaptive to different kind of task including classification for malware de-
tection and ranking / regression for risk estimation. With probabilistic machine leaning
model, the result of security analysis may adapt to more flexible interpretation and easier
for further analysis and integration. In our work, we mainly adopt probability machine
learning technique as our tool for the analysis.
1.1.1 Direct Analysis
Many works have been done to analysis the security issues of mobile apps directly from
the information released from the developer.
Code Analysis Code analysis tries analysis the security issues through analyzing the code
of the App. These includes static analysis that extract features from the executables
of mobile App, and dynamic analysis that utilize features captured while the App is
running.
Permission Analysis Permission analysis analyze mobile App by evaluating the permis-
sion requested and / or used of the App.
Please refer to Section 2.2.2 for a more detailed introduction for related works. Following
this line of work, we propose to conduct a experiment based work that utilized discrimi-
nated probabilistic model for detecting malicious mobile apps based on decompiled .apk
package and the permissions requested. Experiments demonstrate that our approach may
detect malicious mobile App in a over 95% manner in the measure of F1 value.
41.1.2 Indirect Analysis
Indirect source of mobile apps comes mostly from user comments submitted to online
App store (e.g. Google Play for Android apps). There have not been much indirect analysis
of mobile apps for the purpose of security concern. However, user comment analysis have
been utilized in many previous works (please refer to Section 3.2.2 for more detail).
By considering the user comments as an indirect source of information, we propose a
novel model for estimating the security risk of mobile apps. There are two steps of these
line of work which we separated into two tasks: how to extract relevant security topics
from user comments and how to estimate the security risk of apps from the security topics.
1.1.3 Comparison and Combination
Both direct and indirect source are valuable in analyzing security issues for mobile
apps, but the different perspectives may rise some interesting question when we compare
them. For example, the permission analysis task in many works[] compare the difference
of the requested permissions to the ones actually used in the code of the App, and predict
security risk by the difference of the two, but from the users’ point of view, the requested
permissions are always compared to the role and functionality of the App that the user
comprehended. We propose to compare the two perspective by comparing code analysis in
multiple security related tasked on mobile apps to user comment analysis on those similar
tasks, and identify the strength and weakness of both source.
Moreover, combining both source of direct and indirect provide a promising approach
in improving the performance of risk estimation of mobile apps. We propose a multi-view
learning approach to incorporate both source in a mobile App security risk estimation task,
and expect to show better performance from the combining of source than each individual
ones.
51.2 Research Problems
In this dissertation, my main focus is on how to solve the following research problems:
• How can we apply machine learning technique in traditional security problem, like
code analysis in malware detection, for Android apps?
• How can we utilize information from non-traditional perspective like the user com-
ments in security analysis for Android apps?
• How to compare the usage of code analysis and user comment analysis in mobile
App security.
• Can we combine information from both perspective and improve performance in
estimation mobile App security risk?
The rest of the dissertation will be organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents a experiment
based analysis on how to utilize discriminative probabilistic model on decompiled code of
mobile App for malware detection. Chapter 3 presents a novel method for extracting secu-
rity related topics from user comments of mobile apps. Furthermore, Chapter 4 proposes
a joint algorithm that estimates both the credibility of users who give comments and the
security risk of the apps. Moreover, Chapter 5 described our work that compare our user
comment based analysis to traditional code analysis based work with case studies. And
finally Chapter 6 will summarize the proposal.
62 A PROBABILISTIC DISCRIMINATIVE MODEL FOR ANDROID MALWARE
DETECTION WITH DECOMPILED SOURCE CODE
2.1 Motivation
In this chapter, we demonstrate how we can apply machine learning technique in de-
tecting malicious mobile apps. The task fall into the real threats category of security issues
and the source of information is the decompile code of apps. Without complicated code
analysis, this work treat decompiled code of apps as text document and extract function
name from it.
2.2 Introduction and Related Works
2.2.1 Introduction
There has been a steady rise of smart mobile devices for both personal and business
use. These devices run applications that have unprecedented access to private information,
including contacts, emails, geo-location data, personal and business files, and much more.
There is also explicit monetary risk associated with these devices since phone calls, mes-
sages, and data usage can cost money. More directly, these devices often have access to
users’ bank accounts through an application or as a means to authenticate to a bank, and
in the future it seems likely that phones may act as a digital wallet, directly accessing the
bank accounts as part of the functionality. While the existence of this information and ac-
cess creates much of the value found in a smart mobile device, it also makes these devices
attractive targets for malicious entities.
The paradigm for program distribution on these mobile devices also differs from that
of the traditional PCs. Many developers are releasing applications to one or a few central
application markets. While there are third party application stores, currently all popular
7mobile device platforms have central application stores as the primary mechanism of appli-
cation distribution. Android has Google Play as the primary store, Kindle uses the Amazon
Appstore for Android, iOS has iTunes App Store, Windows RT has the Windows Store, and
BlackBerry has AppWorld. This new paradigm presents both challenges and opportunities
for malware defense. Instead of most programs coming from a relatively small number
of reputable vendors, which enables protection based on whitelisting and signed software
distributions, in mobile devices there are many more developers, many of which have in-
sufficient history to establish reputation. On the other hand, centralized markets provide
opportunities for techniques to analyze applications by extracting some set of measurable
features, and identifying potentially malicious applications in the set.
In [1–3], researchers have developed several approaches that use the permissions re-
quested by an Android application to identify whether the application is potentially ma-
licious. In [2], requesting a certain permission or a certain combination of two or three
permissions triggers a warning that the application is risky. In [3], requesting a critical per-
mission that is rarely requested is viewed as a signal that the application is risky. In [1], four
probabilistic generative models are used to to identify potentially malicious applications in-
cluding Basic Naive Bayes (BNB), Naive Bayes with informative Priors (PNB), Mixture
of Naive Bayes (MNB), and Hierarchical Mixture of Naive Bayes (HMNB). Experimen-
tal results show that these models significantly outperform prior approaches in [2, 3] using
the Area Under Curve (AUC) for the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve as
evaluation metric.
However, permissions only provide a high-level and inaccurate view of the behavior
of an application. An application may request a permission without actually using the
permission [4]. Furthermore, a permission often controls multiple actions. For example,
the READ PHONE STATE permission gives access to the devices IMEI via getDeviceId()
which can be misused, the current caller is available via getCallerInfo(. . . ) which has pri-
vacy implications, but this permission also grants access to more commonly used functions
and intents such as the “android.intent.action.PHONE STATE” intent to detect changes in
the network connection type and similar changes to phone state. On the other hand, we
8observe that applications are generally distributed in a form that can be decompiled into
source code which enables more detailed analysis of the applications. In particular, mobile
platforms like the Android system provide rich and well-defined APIs with useful semantic
values for accessing the underlying rich types of data. If an application needs to access
a user’s contact information, it generally needs to achieve this goal via well-defined API
calls, which can be captured by the decompiled source code.
Therefore, we expect that using decompiled source code of Android applications can
provide more detailed information than the list of permissions that the applications request.
We thus hypothesize that properly designed probabilistic models with decompiled applica-
tion source code, either in place of or in addition to, permission data, are able to provide
highly accurate results in identifying potentially malicious applications.
Generative probabilistic models in [1] assume that some parameterized random process
generates the application data (i.e., permissions) and learn model parameters which opti-
mize the fit of the model to the applications used in training. Then one can compute the
probability of each application being generated by the models, and identify those with low
probabilities as potentially malicious applications. The strength of generative models is
that they work with unlabeled data, in other words without information on malicious ap-
plications. On the other hand, discriminative models have been shown to effectively utilize
labeled training data in many applications such as text categorization [5] and image classi-
fication [6]. Discriminative models maximize objective functions that reflect classification
accuracy with respect to labeled training data. As many malicious Android applications
have already been identified in previous work [7], the labeled training information may
enable discriminative learning to achieve more accurate results for Android malware de-
tection.
We propose a probabilistic discriminative model for Android malware detection as a
binary classification problem by using decompiled source code to generate features. In
particular, a Regularized Logistic Regression (RLR) model is designed to generate prob-
abilistic outputs that enable users to better interpret the probabilistic results of Android
9malware detection, which may be more desired than alternative discriminative learning
models like support vector machine with non-probabilistic outputs.
One approach is to view decompiled source code as texts, and use techniques for docu-
ment classification for Android malware detection. However, source code is different from
documents, and this difference presents some interesting new questions. An interesting
question is what features to extract from the source code. For example, one can choose
to use a word-count representation commonly used in document classification or a binary
representation. In addition, one can choose features at different granularity such as the
package, class, or function level representation. When classes or functions are used, the
number of features may be very large. Feature selection techniques may prove benefi-
cial for accuracy and efficiency. Another interesting question is whether combining source
code with permissions can present better results than using source code and permissions
separately.
There are many options for an evaluation metric. AUC of ROC is a popular choice used
by many researchers [1,8]. However, AUC of ROC is reported to be “overly optimistic” of
the performance in case of a highly imbalanced dataset [9]. Therefore other metrics like F1
value may be considered as a more reliable metric, since in reality, malicious applications
are a very small portion of all the applications, and the precision metric used by F1 can
better reflect the performance under imbalanced data.
In summary, the research in this paper makes significant contributions for Android mal-
ware detection as follows:
• We propose a probabilistic discriminative model based on regularized logistic re-
gression for Android malware detection with decompiled source code, which can
generate much more accurate detection results than previous research with applica-
tion permissions or with source code.
• We discuss and present experiments to show that the F1 value is a better metric to
understand and compare the performance of malicious application detection.
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• We provide thorough empirical studies and discussion for exploring desired represen-
tation of decompiled source code such as feature extraction, representation granular-
ity and feature selection and modeling strategies for effective and efficient Android
malware detection.
• We further extend the proposed discriminative probabilistic model for utilizing both
decompiled source code and permissions, which generates even better results for
Android malware detection. As far as we know, this is the first research work that
combines analysis of both source code and permissions for the task.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2.2 reviews related research
work in Android malware detection. Section 2.3 proposes our new research for the task.
Section 2.4 presents an extensive set of experiments to demonstrate the advantage of pro-
posed research. Section 2.6 concludes the contribution of this paper.
2.2.2 Related Works
Malware Detection - Static: One issue for malware detection is to determine the right
features to extract from executables. One research thrust has focused on binary analysis,
looking at the bytes of the binary on disk or in memory. Kolter et al. [10] look at n-grams
from the binary for classification, where an n-gram is n consecutive bytes. They use these
features in conjunction with several machine learning techniques including naive Bayes,
decision trees, support vector machines (SVM) and boosting, and obtain reasonable per-
formance. BitShred [11] extends the previous idea while focusing on modern malware and
scalability, extracting features in several ways to handle encrypted code and using feature
hashing to compress the feature space effectively while still maintaining the performance
of standard machine learning techniques.
In the context of mobile, some work on static analysis has also been performed, typi-
cally focusing on all functions that are used by an application. One common problem in
third party application stores is piracy and malware. It is possible to buy an application,
repackage the application unchanged or with malicious code added, and then submit it to
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a third party application store for others to install. Desnos [12] uses compression and dis-
tance on source code to find applications that have high overlap in order to detect piracy
and malware between the official market and third party markets. Schmidt et al. [8, 13]
use static function call analysis to detect mobile malware. They apply their technique to
both Symbian and Android to extract function calls from binaries and then perform basic
machine learning techniques such as nearest neighbor and clustering. They focus on tradi-
tional unix/linux elf binaries; however, most known mobile malware comes in the form of
an application, i.e. an .apk file, and not as an elf. Their focus on elf binaries is likely due
to the timing of the work, which precedes most known malware and comes shortly after
Android’s initial release.
Enck et al. [14] perform static data flow analysis on application files by decompiling
and analyzing the source code to detect data leaks. They find many applications that leak
information off the phone, but do not find any evidence of malicious applications in their
data. RiskRanker [7] and DroidRanger [15] focus on the task of finding malicious applica-
tions in various Android markets. They use a few detection techniques to identify possibly
risky behavior in an application, and then perform further analysis to identify true malicious
behavior and false positives. The detection techniques look for actions expected from mal-
ware: specific code signatures for known attacks, behavioral indicators such as sending an
SMS automatically and not associated with a user clicking a button, encrypted native code,
and dynamic code loading. These techniques are all basically signature based, looking for
pre-specified patterns or behavior. By contrast, our approach is data driven, using labeled
data to determine which features are important for classification.
Aafer et al. [16] perform static data flow analysis to extract feature from the bytecode of
applications. Both APIs and the parameters of the APIs in the bytecode are extracted and
APIs are filtered by the relative usage frequency between benign and malicious applica-
tions. K-nearest-neighbor method is proposed to work with these features and compared to
permission feature. To distinguish our work with theirs, we propose a probabilistic model
that could output meaningful probabilistic results and learns the weight of APIs and per-
missions automatically instead of picking the highest relatively frequent ones. We also
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present results that combines both API feature and permission feature, which performs the
best in our experiments.
Malware Detection - Dynamic: Another major approach focuses on behavioral analysis
of malware. In the desktop setting, Christodorescu et al. [17] allow code to execute and
monitor system calls in order to identify behavioral traces of a binary. They collect traces
for both benign and malicious applications and determine what traces characterize mali-
cious binaries in order to identify unknown malware that performs similar functionality.
This work uses dependence graphs to construct minimal representations for the malicious
behavior, and then looks for these same behaviors in other binaries. Other work has used
the same general idea of behavioral analysis, but extended the technique of matching ma-
licious code using several machine learning techniques such as support vector machines
(SVM) [18] and clustering [19].
For dynamic detection of mobile malware, Shabtai et al. [20] present a behavioral-based
detection framework for Android that monitors certain observable events originating from
applications and classifies them via lightweight machine learning techniques. The focus
here is relatively efficient behavioral detection since it is performed directly on the device
where power may be limited. Portokalidis [21] propose a security solution where security
checks are applied on remote security servers that host replicas of the phones in virtual
environments. In their work, the servers are not subject to the constraints faced by smart-
phones and hence this allows multiple detection techniques to be used simultaneously. They
implemented a prototype and show the low data transfer requirements of their application.
CrowDroid [22] provides a framework to dynamically analyze applications behavior to
detect malware on the Android platform. They collect the system traces from many real
users and send them to a central server for analysis to detect behavioral differences between
applications that should generally have the same behavior. Their goal is primarily to detect
malware that has been repackaged and distributed on third party application stores.
While dynamic approaches can offer the most information regarding application be-
havior, it is difficult to explore all possible behaviors of an application ahead of time, and
it can be resource intensive to collect directly on a device. Additionally it is difficult to
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capture fine grained behavior profiles in Android without rooting a device and installing a
system designed to collect this information. On the other hand, since the application store
is centralized, an approach which can more directly utilize data from all applications is
preferred. Due to the complexity of permission and system level functions, it seems likely
that performing static analysis of the API calls can provide a robust feature space, which is
the approach we take in this work.
Android Permissions Analysis: PScout [23] performs static code analysis on the Android
source to extract function to permission mappings. They find that the Android permission
system has little redundancy and it remains relatively stable as the Android OS evolves.
They also show how many functions require specific permissions, demonstrating the com-
plexity of the system and that a permission may have many reasons for being requested.
In [24] Felt et al. conduct a more general survey of applications (free and paid) from the
Android Market. One key observation was that 93% of free applications and 82% of paid
applications request permissions that they deem as “dangerous”. This demonstrates that
users are accustomed to installing applications with potentially intrusive or dangerous per-
missions requests. This also highlights a need to identify possibly malicious applications
and communicate that risk to users. Felt et al. [4] also use static analysis to check if an
Android application requests permissions which it is never actually used. They evaluate
940 applications and find that about one-third are over-privileged, showing that it is not
always the case that the permissions requested reflect the true underlying functionality of
an application. This difference between permission requests and permission use is another
reason that we believe source code analysis will benefit the detection task.
Evaluation Metrics: In [25], the relationship between ROC and Precision Recall Curve
(PRC) is analyzed, connections and differences between the two curves are illustrated. Fur-
thermore, [9] systematically studied the learning process in imbalanced data, and pointed
out AUC of ROC is too optimistic with imbalanced data, and PRC can better reflect the
performance under the situation of imbalanced data. Therefore F1 score that computed on
a proper point of PRC may be a better evaluation metric and is adopted in this paper.
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2.3 Algorithm
Our goal is to develop effective techniques that can classify whether an application is
likely to be malicious, given its .apk file, which includes both the code of the application
and the list of permissions that the application requests.
In this section, we first describe how to extract features from the .apk files, and then
describe our proposed Probabilistic Discriminative Model.
2.3.1 Source Code Feature Extraction
Android applications are packed as .apk files. To extract features from them, we first
decompile the .apk files into Java source code files, and then extract features from the
source code.
Decompile
We first unpack .apk files to get .dex files, and then use the dex2jar1 tool to convert the
.dex file to .jar file. We then use the jad2 tool to decompile the .class files in a .jar file to
Java source files. For each application, it takes approximately 2-3 minutes to decompile
it into Java files. The decompiled Java files misses some information about the names
of classes and variables (e.g., in “private static class a”, the name “a” is not meaningful).
However, this does not affect our feature extraction because the calls to the Android API are
maintained and these are the functions that we care about as they reveal the actual behavior
of an application.
Feature Granularities
In the Android platform, most critical operations are carried out by making API calls;




can view the source code as documents, and apply document classification techniques to
the problem. In document classification, term frequency (TF) is typically used as features.
There are three natural levels of granularity: package, class, and functions in Android for
API feature representation. For each level of granularity, we obtain from the source code
the TF. For the package-level and class-level features, we scan the import statements to
count how many times a package/class is imported. For the function-level, we need to
scan all the Java source files to obtain the number of occurrences of each function in one
application.
We obtain the lists of package, class and function names from Google Android API
document Version 4.2. See Table 2.1 to see the number of features at different granularities.
The rules we use to extract the features are:
1. For the package-level feature, since in the import statements, the substring before the
last dot is the name of a package, e.g., “import java.io.File”, “java.io” is a package.
We count these substrings to obtain the package-level features.
2. For the class-level feature, we count the whole string after “import” to obtain the
class-level features. Notice that, the number of class here is the sum of the number of
packages and the number of classes in Google Android API document. The reason is
that some applications use the import statements with “*”, e.g., “import java.util.*;”.
When we extract the class-level features, in order to deal with this case, we discard
the “*” and just consider it as “import java.util”. Because “java.util” is a package, we
add the packages into the class-level features. In fact, the class-level features used in
this paper contain both the packages and classes.
3. For the function-level feature, we scan the whole Java files to obtain the count of
each function. However, some function names are shared by multiple classes, e.g.,
“toString()”, the method which is used to extract the function-level feature can only
get an estimated count of the occurrence of each function, not an accurate count. Be-
cause Java is an Object Oriented Programming (OOP) language, functions may be
overloaded or inherited by subclasses, the class that one function actually belongs to
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can only be determined during the run time. In other words, we can obtain the accu-
rate count of the occurrence of each function only by dynamic analysis or advanced
software engineering techniques. Therefore, we just use the estimated count in this
paper. We discard all constructors listed in Google Android API document.
In general, higher-dimension and finer-grained features provide more information and thus
may result in higher accuracy. On the other hand, higher-dimension representation may
lead to more sparsity and potentially causes overfitting, and thus requires techniques such
as feature selection and/or regularization to avoid overfitting.





Source Code Feature Representation
Besides the granularity of the source code features, how the feature values are calcu-
lated is also an important issue. We extract the Term Frequency (TF) of the features, indi-
cating how many time a feature term (package, class or function) appears in the decompiled
source files of an .apk file. Some other choices are listed below:
• Binary: Truncate the TF to either 0 or 1. That is, if TF  1, set it to 1. This feature
simply indicates whether a term appears or not. While this is uncommon in document
classification, the nature of programming makes this an interesting representation.
This is due to the fact that as long as an API function is included once inside one
wrapper function, it can be used elsewhere without directly referring to the function
name, but instead merely by calling the wrapper.
• log(TF+1): Transform the TF to log scale. It is a common usage for TF in document
classification to remove the influence of a large TF value.
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• Inverse Document Frequency (IDF):
IDF = #Documents#Documents have the term+1 . The intuition is that a termmore unique for a document
is more indicative for the document than other more common terms. The +1 is used
to avoid division by zero. We apply log(IDF) to the TF, Binary and log(TF+ 1).
Feature Selection Methods
Feature selection technique is widely used for data preprocessing. The purpose is to
find out the most valuable features. The benefit of feature selection is two fold. First,
it may improve efficiency. Reduced feature dimensionality results in fewer parameters
in the model and less training and testing time. Second, it may improve accuracy. The
abandoned features may actually be noisy for the task and may cause over-fitting, hence
the performance may be improved after feature selection.
We use Information Gain (IG) and Chi-square test (CHI) for feature selection [26],
which can be calculated very efficiently (i.e. , in one pass of source code files). IG mea-
sures the mutual dependence of the label and features, while CHI measures the lack of
independence between them, hence both are reasonable choices for feature selection. Both
feature selection methods assign scores to all the features, and the features with high scores
will be selected. Let {ci}mi=1 be the labels form categories (m = 2 for binary classification)














And for CHI it is:
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where N is the size of samples, A is the number of times that t and c co-occur, B is the
number of times t occurs without c, C is the times c occurs without t,D is the times neither
t nor c occurs. Then  2avg(t) is the score function.
2.3.2 Probabilistic Discriminative Model for Classification
As describe previously, the malware detection task is treated as a feature-based clas-
sification problem. The malware applications are the “positive” samples, and the benign
are the “negative” samples. The purpose of a classifier is to learn a “model” from the
training samples to most effectively predict labels for the training data. Then the learned
“model” can be applied to a new sample, to predict whether the new sample gets a positive
or negative label.
In a classification problem, we use X to denote the input, i.e. , the features from a
sample, and Y to denote the output, i.e. the class label. A probabilistic (statistical) model
builds probabilistic relationship between the input features and the class label. In partic-
ular, one computes the posterior probability of the output variable Y given the input X ,
i.e. , Pr(Y |X). If one constructs models for how the sample (features) is generated by the
class as Pr(X|Y ), and then apply the Bayes rule to compute Pr(Y |X), it is called a prob-
abilistic generative model; if one models the Pr(Y |X) directly, it is called a probabilistic
discriminative model.
This section proposes a generative model, the 2-class Naive Bayes with Prior (2-PNB)
and a discriminative model, the Regularized Logistic Regression (RLR) to work with
source code features for the Android malware detection task. As baselines for compari-
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son, we also include some discussions for two other generative models, PNB and HMNB,
proposed in [1].
2 Class Naive Bayes with Prior
Naive Bayes (NB) is frequently used as a base line for classification since it performs








✓xii,Y (1  ✓i,Y )(1 xi) (2.1)
where X = [x1, x2, · · · , xn] is the feature vector, and a Bernoulli distribution with pa-
rameter ✓i,Y is associated with a binary feature value as the ith feature in class Y . To learn
this model, given class Y 2 {0, 1}, negative training sample X0 = {X01 , X02 , · · · , X0N0}
and positive training sample X1 = {X11 , X12 , · · · , X1N1}, the Maximum Likelihood Esti-





With proper prior ✓i,Y ⇠ Beta(↵i,Y ,  i,Y ), the Maximum A Priori (MAP) becomes:
✓ˆi,Y =
P
X2XY xi + ↵i,Y
NY + ↵i,Y +  i,Y
The prior can be informative, like PNB in [1], giving different features different impor-
tance based on some expert knowledge. Or, it can be uninformative, i.e. using uniform
distribution for the prior. For our work with source code features, the uninformative prior
is adopted to avoid zero probability in computation.
20
To predict the label of a new sample X 0, the following probability is computed:
Pr(Y = 1|X 0)
/ Pr(X 0|Y = 1)Pr(Y = 1)
=
Pr(X 0|Y = 1)Pr(Y = 1)
Pr(X 0|Y = 1)Pr(Y = 1) + Pr(X 0|Y = 0)Pr(Y = 0)
where Pr(X 0|Y ) is computed as in equation (2.1), and Pr(Y ) = NYN0+N1 . Then a
threshold may be found in training set for Pr(Y = 1|X 0) to make the prediction.
This is a common way to use NB as a binary classifier, and will be called 2 class
Naive Bayes with Prior (2-PNB) in this paper, to distinguish it from the Naive Bayes with
informative Prior (PNB) from [1]. The PNB model only utilizes negative samples to train
the model, and predicts a label based on the likelihood of a new sample given the model.
The 2-PNB model on the other hand utilizes both negative and positive samples to train the
model and predict based on posterior probability of the label given test sample, hence it is
expected to have better performance in classification. 2-PNB also works as an intermediate
model between PNB and LR, which will be discussed in the next section.
Logistic Regression
Logistic Regression (LR) is a popular classifier as a probabilistic discriminative model.
Given a feature vector X and the class label Y 2 {1, 1}, the posterior probability is used
to predict the label Y of X:
Pr(Y |X) =  (wTX + b)
where  (a) = (1 + exp( a)) 1 is the sigmoid function. w and b are the model parameters
that need to be estimated in learning process. Note that the posterior probability Pr(Y |X)
is directly modeled by the sigmoid function, indicating that LR is a probabilistic discrimi-
native model.
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Gradient descent can be used in the learning phase of LR to find the MLE of w and
b. The objective function would be the likelihood of the training samples. Given training







The L-BFGS quasi-Newton method [27] is applied in this work to find the best w and b













One aspect of LR is that the learned w parameter provides a hint about how important
individual features are in the classifier. A high magnitude positive value in w implies
that the corresponding feature is favored by the positive samples, and negative value in
w has the same meaning for negative samples. This is a good property for inspecting the
importance of each feature. For example, if the function level feature is applied, the learned
LR model will show which function increase (decrease) the probability of an app being
malicious, and to what extend. Therefore even all feature dimensions are treated equally
in feature representation, their different importances are learned automatically during the
model learning process.
It can be seen that LR directly models the posterior probability for classification as a
discriminative model, while the NB related methods focus on input generation probability
(i.e. Pr(X|Y )) and use Bayes rule to model posterior probability as generative models.
Therefore LR models may have an advantage when modeling posterior probability and
achieving better classification performance. In Section 2.4, it will be thoroughly studied
and compared to other models mentioned in this section.
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Model Regularization
Regularization is usually applied with LR to avoid the overfitting problem. Without it,
LR and many other models may “overfit” the training data and perform very well in training
but much worse on the test set. Regularization is achieved by adding a penalty term into the
objective function to make the trade-off between the optimization of the original objective
function (i.e., related with accuracy or loss) and the complexity of the learned model. The
objective function of Regularized LR (RLR) looks like this:
minw,b(NLL(w, b) +   · penalty(w, b))
where   is a parameter to tune the trade-off of the loss function (NLL) and the penalty term.
These parameters are tuned in the training set by cross validation. In our experiments, 5-
fold cross validation is adapted. The training set is evenly divided into 5 pieces and each
piece of data is rotationally selected as a pseudo testing set with the rest 4 pieces as pseudo
training set. With these 5 pairs of sets, a possible range of the parameters are evaluated and
the best in average will be used in testing.
Some popular forms of the term include Ridge (|w|22, i.e. l2 norm), Lasso (|w|21, i.e.
l1 norm), and Similarity based norm (wTLw) [28]. Ridge norm represents the “natural”
distance metric in Euclidean space and the norm and its derivative are easy to compute.
When using Lasso, the penalty term will try to force the optimization process to produce a
more sparse result of model parameters, which means the resulting w tends to have more
zero values than using Ridge. This is particularly useful when the feature dimension is high
and the feature representation is sparse. The similarity based norm utilizes the Laplacian
Matrix to embed the similarity between the features into the optimization process. It tries to
force the resulting w to assign similar values to those features that are considered similar or
related. When applied to source code features, the co-occurrence matrix is used to compute
the Laplacian matrix L, as







where& and | are binary “and” and “or” operator, xi are assumed binary and the+1 is used
to avoid division by zero. Then L = D   A, D is a diagonal matrix with its diagonal ele-
ments Dii =
P
j Ai,j . All the three regularization strategies have their advantage, and it is
hard to say beforehand which one maybe better on this task. The performance comparison
of these strategies will be shown in Section 2.4.6.
2.4 Experiment
In this section, a series of experiments will be conducted to explore the desired feature
representation and modeling strategies for Android malware detection. Many aspects of the
classification process will be investigated in different stages. Each stage of the experiments
is actually used to answer one of the following questions:
1. What granularity should be used to extract the features from applications? (Sec-
tion 2.4.3)
2. How to calculate feature values for better Android malware detection? (Section 2.4.4)
3. Can feature selection help? If it does, in which way? Performance or dimension
reduction? (Section 2.4.5)
4. Does the model require regularization? If it does, what kind of regularization should
we choose? (Section 2.4.6)
5. How is the performance of proposed model compared to other learning methods?
(Section 2.4.7 and Section 2.4.8)
6. Can the source code features be combined with the permission features to further
improve the detection performance? (Section 2.4.9)
The default setting for experiments are as following:
model: Regularized Logistic Regression (RLR) with lasso (L1) norm is chosen as the
default classifier.
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feature: The binary features (no IDF) in granularity of Java Function level are used as
features.
Many experiments are conducted to explore one component of the default setting (e.g.,
granularity in Section 2.4.3) by fixing other components.
2.4.1 Dataset Settings
The datasets we use are described in Table 2.4. They are collected from different
sources. C11, C12, and CM are used in [1]. C11 contains 71331 applications collected
from Google Play in February 2011 and C12 contains 98510 applications collected from
Google Play in February 2012. C11 and C12 only contain permission and category in-
formation. Applications in them are presumably benign. CM contains 378 malicious
applications, shared from the authors of [29]. We use these datasets to compare directly
with results in [1].
O consists of 12,801 presumably benign .apk files from Google Play, which were ob-
tained from authors of [16]. OM consists of 1260 malicious applications, shared by the
authors of [29]. Since OM is collected later than CM , CM is a subset of OM . We can
extract source code features for O and OM .
To ensure reliable evaluation, we remove the duplicate applications within each set
and the overlap applications between related sets. The reason for this cleaning is to make
sure that no developer or application can overly influence the model, which could have
implications in testing. Duplicates are removed from the C11 and C12 sets by looking
at developer information and permission vectors, removing all exact matches. Duplicate
applications within O and OM and CM are cleaned by looking at package names which
are obtained from the correspondingmanifest.xml files and permission vectors. The original
size and size after cleaning are shown in Table 2.4.
In order to make a thorough comparison, we create 5 training/testing settings by com-
bining the datasets, as shown in Table 2.4. S5 is the only setting where .apk files are
available, and is the main experimental setting in which we evaluate methods using source
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code features. S1 to S4 are used to evaluate methods using only permission features. S1
is the setting used in [1], so that we can directly compare with the results there. S2, S3
and S4 vary the combinations to provide different situations for comparing three generative
models and our discriminative model using permission features.
Table 2.4 also gives the malicious sample ratio (i.e., the ratio of malicious applica-
tions to all applications) in all 5 pairs of training/testing settings. Note that, in some train-
ing/testing settings (e.g., S4), the malicious sample ratios of training are different from the
ratios in the testing set, which reflect the fact that training data and testing data may not
always be consistent in realistic setting for malware detection.
It’s worth noting that the ground truth for those benign apps are assumed benign only
because they are from Google Play. The evaluation is set out to test the proposed method
for detecting known malicious apps from those in Google Play, instead of finding a new
strain of malware. How to apply the proposed method to find malware in Google Play
would be an interesting future work.
2.4.2 Evaluation Metric
We consider two evaluation metrics, the F1 score and AUC of ROC score. Given the
ground truth information and the prediction/classification results, there are four possible
outcomes: true positive (TP), true negative (TN), false positive (FP), and false negative
(FN). These are shown in the Table 2.2, which also gives an example of the number of each
outcomes. For example, TP means an application is malicious with respect to ground truth
and it is classified as malicious, and similarly for other terms.
Table 2.2.: Terms related in evaluation metrics and an example
Actual class
True False
Predicted Positive TP (95) FP (190)
class Negative FN (5) TN (3610)
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From these we can compute Precision = TPTP+FP ⇡ 0.33, and Recall = TPTP+FN = 0.95.
Recall is also known as the detection rate or the True Positive Rate (TPR), and gives the
percentage of malicious applications detected. Precision is the Bayesian detection rate,
and gives the percentage of detected applications actually being malicious. F1 score is the






2⇥ TP+ FN+ FP ⇡ 0.49
When a method has a threshold parameter for classifying whether an application is mali-
cious or not, we apply the trained model to the training set, and the selected threshold is
the one that maximizes the F1 value in training set.
The AUC score is the area under the ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) curve.
ROC curve considers two variables: TPR (i.e., the Recall) and False Positive Rate (FPR).
TPR stands for the probability that a classifier classifies true samples correctly. The def-
inition of FPR is FPR = FPFP+TN. FPR stands for the probability that a classifier classifies
false samples incorrectly. For binary-class classification problem, a threshold is needed to
classify the results into two classes: positive or negative. Therefore, for different threshold
choices, different FPR-TPR combinations (as well as Precision-Recall combinations) can
be calculated. Each combination is a point in the ROC space, linking all the points pro-
duces the ROC curve. The larger the AUC score, the better the classifier performs. AUC of
ROC is computed w.r.t. a ranked list of the results.
We do not plot the ROC curves in this paper as an evaluation metric. The reason is that
many of the ROC curves in our experiments are mixed together to the top-left corner (when
the AUC of ROC is over 90%), requiring a zooming in to tell the difference. This is due
to the disadvantage of ROC curve in classification task comparing to F1: the ROC curve is
too optimistic for imbalanced data.
The physical meaning of AUC of ROC is the probability that a randomly selected posi-
tive sample has high score than a randomly selected negative sample [30]. This probability
may not be so meaningful under the situation of imbalanced data, due to the Base Rate
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Fallacy [31]. When the number of malicious applications is small relative to the total num-
ber of applications, it is possible to have high TPR and low FPR (and thus high AUC of
ROC), yet low precision (namely, Bayersian detection rate), and thus low F1. The example
in Table 2.2 has TPR= 0.95 and FPR= 0.05, but a F1 score of less than 0.5.
Accuracy is another metric used by some work [16], it is computed as Accuracy =
TP+TN
TP+TN+FP+FN = 0.95 for the example in Table 2.2. It is also clearly very optimistic for
imbalanced data. Actually, a trivial classifier that always predicts Negative would give an
accuracy of 0.97 already.
2.4.3 Experiments for Granularity of Source Code Features
The experiments in the next subsections are conducted with S5, where the source code
features are available. In this stage of experiments, the granularity of the source code fea-
tures are explored. The candidates are Java package level, class level and function level.
The numbers dimensions are 179, 3497, and 22136 for package, class and function respec-
tively. Table 2.3 shows the performance of the three granularity levels using binary feature
expression. The function level representation outperforms the others. The result indicates
that finer level of the source code feature provides better performance, which is consistent
with our expectation since a package or class may have various functionality that is not all
informative.
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2.4.4 Experiments for Source Code Feature Representation
Various types of feature representations introduced in Section 2.3.1 are tested in this
stage of experiments with function level granularity. In particular, we investigate the usage
of term frequency, log term frequency and binary representation. We will also investigate
how inverse document frequency affects classification performance.
As shown in the Figure 2.1, the best choice for feature representation is Binary. One
reason for this is that the TF representation is not an accurate reflection of how often a func-
tion is used in an application. A function can appear in source code multiple times but not
be used, or it can be present only once but be invoked many times. The actual function use
can only be determined at runtime or through advanced code analysis techniques due to the
dynamic nature of Object Oriented language like Java. Hence using only binary features,
i.e. whether a function is present or not, provides less noise and is more reliable. The same
results have also been observed for feature representation with class level granularity. The
reason why using IDF gives similar or mixed results may be related to the RLR model that
we use. The training process of the RLR model finds a weight vector which indicates the
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Figure 2.2.: Performance of binary function level feature representation for s5 using RLR
for classification
2.4.5 Experiments for Feature Selection on Source Code Feature
Three feature selection methods are used in this stage to find out whether the feature
dimension can be reduced or the performance can be improved. We focus on function
level representation, where the original dimension of the feature space is 22, 136. IG and
CHI, as introduced in Section 2.3.1, are used as two feature selection methods. Moreover,
as discussed in 2.3.2, the parameters of RLR model can indicate the importance of the
individual features, and thus it is also enlisted to provide feature selection result.
Figure 2.2 shows the performance of the RLR method using 0.1% to 100% of the to-
tal features selected by the three methods mentioned above. As shown in the figure, the
performance of using 10% of features degrades very little compared to using all features
especially for the IG and CHI selection methods. Therefore, if efficiency is an issue in real
world applications, a good trade-off between effectiveness and efficiency can be achieved
by the feature selection methods.
We list the top 20 functions which are selected by IG in Figure 2.3. For each func-
tion in the figure, we calculate the percentage of benign and malicious applications which
use this function. This information is also shown in Figure 2.3. As shown in the fig-
ure, some critical functions, e.g. “getSubscriberId()” and “getInstalledPackages()”, are
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Figure 2.3.: Percentage of benign/malicious applications using the top 20 functions selected
by IG.
more likely to be used by malicious applications. However, some normal functions like
“android.graphics.Color.blue” are also in the list. This could be an coincident due to the
dataset property, since the number of malwares is much lesser than the benign ones. Also,
normal functions, if their popularities are statistically different in malware from benign
ones, are still useful for detecting malware. Moreover, it is worth clarifying that the func-
tions shown in Figure 2.3 are far from what are used in detection. In fact, as shown in
Figure 2.2, we need at least about 50% (over 11, 000 functions) of the features to maintain
a similar performance to the best that uses all features. Therefore, in order to fully evaluate
the performance of the proposed method, the full sized feature (22, 136 functions) are used
in the rest of the experiments.
2.4.6 Experiments for Model Regularization
Different regularization methods for the proposed RLR method are explored in this
stage of experiments with binary feature presentation in the function level. In particular,
we compare the no regularization approach, ridge regularization, lasso regularization and
similarity based regularization as introduced in Section 2.3.2. Table 2.5 shows the results
with the 4 different regularization settings. First, the method without using regulariza-
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tion is outperformed by all the other methods since this method suffers from over-fitting
in the high dimensional space of functions. The lasso regularization gives the best per-
formance, while the ridge regularization gives the second best performance. One possible
reason why lasso works well is the feature dimensionality is high and the feature vectors
are quite sparse, hence the lasso regularization, which constrains the objective function to
find a sparse solution better fits in the situation. The similarity matrix used in similarity
regularization is computed using the function co-occurrence matrix. Yet two function calls
co-occur in the source code of an application may actually belong to two different func-
tional modules of the application, it is hard to say if the two functions are closely related or
not. Hence the co-occurrence probability may not be as reliable as expected.
2.4.7 Model Comparison with Permission Feature
The above experiments are all conducted with RLR and features from source code. Two
generative models called Naive Bayes with Informative Priors(PNB) and Hierarchical Mix-
ture of Naive Bayes(HMNB) proposed in [1] use permission features to detect malicious
application in the Android platform. It would be interesting to compare RLR, which is a
discriminative model, to PNB and HNMB, with permission features.
The experiments in [1] use the evaluation metric AUC of ROC. A comparison experi-
ment is first done on the S1, which is built by following the instruction of [1], to compare
AUC of ROC to F1 and verify our implementation of those two methods. Table 2.6 shows
the performance of our implemented PNB and HMNB with both AUC and F1 for evalua-
tion. As shown in the table, the AUC of PNB and HMNB are 0.937 and 0.948 respectively,
which matches the result posted in [1]. It is worth noting that although the AUC of ROC
scores look very good, the corresponding F1 scores are not very high. Moreover, since the
two generative methods use only negative samples for training, there is not a good way of
finding a threshold for classification solely based on their training data. Since the training
dataset does not contain samples of malicious applications, we cannot use cross validation
to choose the threshold. The F1 scores shown in Table 2.6 are actually computed by choos-
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ing the threshold to maximize the F1 scores against the testing data; thus they are the best
F1 scores that can be found in the testing set by using the trained generative models and the
information of ground truth of the testing set. Therefore the F1 scores of the two generative
models are somehow overestimated. We show that even these overestimated F1 scores of
the generative models are still low compared with our approach.
Table 2.7 shows the performance for comparing three generative models (i.e., PNB,
HMNB and 2-PNB) and our discriminative model using permission features over three
training/testing settings. The prior used for PNB and 2-PNB are from [1]. The results
show that, RLR outperforms the others in all cases for F1 score, and is still the best in
most of the cases for AUC score of the ROC metric. Considering the variety of three
different training/testing settings with different sources of the samples and different ratios
of positive samples, the results suggest that RLR is better in classification performance
using permission features than the generative models. 2-PNB method, as a generative
method but utilizing both positive and negative samples in training, performs better than
PNB and HMNB in three settings (i.e., S2, S3 and S5). This indicates the value of using
both positive and negative samples in training. The results of HMNB is similar to PNB,
with a slight advantage in S4. This is consistent to the conclusion in [1]. In summary, the
discriminative model RLR is recommended against the generative models when permission
features are used.
The two settings S4 and S5 share the sample testing set, but S4 is a superset of S5 with
more negative samples. The results indicate that with the smaller training set, the results
are actually better. This is expectable for 2-PNB and RLR, because the larger training
set only includes more negative (benign) samples, the imbalance of positive and negative
samples is more serious, hence hurting the training of models. This is especially the case
for 2-PNB, which applies the positive (negative) sample prior to the testing set. If the
positive sample ratio is quite different in training and testing sets, it hurts the classification
performance of 2-PNB. It is interesting that the performance of both PNB and HMNB
drops with more training data too. There may be two possible reasons. On one hand,
as discussed in Section 2.4.1, the benign samples are only assumed benign since they are
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from the Google Play store. There may be some malicious applications in the benign
sample set, and mixing all the “benign” samples together actually increases the chance of
having malicious samples in training. And both PNB and HMNB use only benign samples
for training, there is no way they can avoid this effect without information from malicious
samples. On the other hand, when the sample size increases, the generative models built by
PNB and HMNB will become more general for fitting a variety of applications in the big
training set, hence the probability of malicious samples may increase as well and this may
cause the drop of performance.
2.4.8 Model Comparison with Source Code Feature
Performance of several methods using functional level source code features are com-
pared in this section. Table 2.8 shows the results in S5. Uninformative prior are applied to
PNB and 2-PNB. The results show that the discriminative model RLR is also better against
the generative models with source code features. The results for PNB and HMNB with
source code features are much worse than 2-PNB and RLR. It is mainly because some of
the assumptions for these two one-class generative models to work with permission fea-
tures are no longer valid for source code feature. For example, malicious applications tend
to request more permissions but may not use more functions.
The results for K Nearest Neighbor (KNN), Decision Tree (DT) and Support Vector
Machine (SVM) are also included here for comparison. The KNN (K = 1 selected from
K 2 {1, 3, 5, 7, 9}) is trained on S5 with the negative sample downsized, otherwise it
cannot get any comparable results. Down-sampling is also utilized for DT to generate
better result. SVM uses a radial basis function kernel and explores the parameter space
using the training set to find optimal training parameters. KNN performs similar to 2-PNB,
DT performs much better than KNN and SVM performs similar to RLR, but RLR has the
advantage of directly generating probabilistic outputs.
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2.4.9 Combination of Source Code and Permission Feature
It is natural to think whether source code features (i.e., function level) and permission
features can be combined to further improve the performance of Android malware detec-
tion, since both types of features have been proven to be useful for the task. Table 2.9 shows
the results of combining both features. The early fusion method combines the two types of
features by concatenating them into one feature vector before applying the RLR. And the
late fusion method trains RLR on both types of features separately and combine the two
learned models afterwards with a meta logistic regression classifier. It can be seen from
the table, using source code feature is better than using permission feature; the combined
features work better than each individual type of features; and the late fusion gives the best
result. The results suggest that although source code feature and permission features are
related, they are still somehow complementary. For example, malicious applications may
request permissions that may not be reflected by the functions. It is better to consider both
types of features in detecting malicious applications in the Android platform.
In addition, Table 2.10 shows the confusion table of the best result (Combined (Late
Fusion)) in S5. As we can see, this is a imbalanced dataset with 389 malicious apps from
5190 apps in total. The algorithm successfully found 374 out of 389 malicious apps (hence
Recall=96.14%), and for the 392 reported suspicious apps, only 18 of them are false alarms
(hence Precision=95.41%). Therefore the F1 value, as the harmonic mean of Recall and
Precision, yields 95.77%. Meanwhile, the false positive rate is 1818+4783 = 0.37%, looks
very optimistic due to the imbalance of the dataset.
2.5 Limitations
Despite the high performance provided by the proposed method, it is worth noting that
the arm race between malicious application and malicious application detection technique
is still on and the high performance observed in our data sets may not be applied directly
to future situations. Therefore it would be very helpful to discuss about the limitations of
the proposed method, together with the causes and effects.
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As a static technique, this method shares the weaknesses of all static techniques on An-
droid application. An application may utilize Reflection and Native Code [4, 32] to make
its real program logic undetectable by static analysis. Other techniques like Bytecode En-
cryption etc. can also be used to hinder static analysis. We note however, that some tools
use the features of using Bytecode encryption and usage of native code as indicators of po-
tentially malicious intention. These are orthogonal to our method. Moreover, Obfuscation
and dead code could cause trouble to our method, leading to unreliable feature extraction
and representation. It would be an interesting future work to find out how to defend against
them (e.g. dead code detection.).
Another limitation is introduced by the nature of supervised learning. The proposed
method utilizes training data to build probabilistic model, under the assumption that the
testing data, which the model will be applied to, is drawn from the same population as the
training data. This assumption is generally not true in reality since malicious application
may evolve. Hence the model need to be updated with new training data including new be-
nign applications and new malicious applications. This disadvantage may limit the model’s
power in detecting zero-day malicious applications.
2.6 Conclusion
Android malware detection is an important research task as the Android platform is a
leader in the fast growing market of mobile devices. This paper proposes to use proba-
bilistic discriminative learning model with decompiled source code as well as permission
features for this problem, and presents thorough evaluations and discussions for Android
malware detection with decompiled source code and beyond. We propose a probabilis-
tic discriminative learning model based on regularized logistic regression, which achieves
highly accurate detection results (i.e., F1 value of about 0.95). Thorough studies have
been conducted to explore desired representation of source code and appropriate model-
ing strategies, suggesting a combination of binary feature over function level of source
code with lasso regularization for RLR. Furthermore, the discriminative learning model
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has been shown to achieve even better results for Android malware detection by combining
both source code and application permissions. Moreover, a discussion over the evaluation
metric suggests that F1 may be a better evaluation metric rather than ROC curve due to the































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.7.: Performance comparison using permission features.
PNB HMNB 2-PNB RLR
S2
F1 0.4106 0.4640 0.5039 0.5911
AUC 0.8747 0.8666 0.9141 0.9454
S3
F1 0.1112 0.1082 0.1342 0.2454
AUC 0.9223 0.9323 0.9428 0.9341
S4
F1 0.4241 0.4412 0.4192 0.7196
AUC 0.8577 0.8620 0.9000 0.9458
S5
F1 0.4442 0.4720 0.6448 0.8373
AUC 0.8717 0.8782 0.9285 0.9661
Table 2.8.: Performance comparison using source code features (function level) in S5.
ACC is for accuracy.
F1 AUC ACC
PNB 0.1511 0.3711 -
HMNB 0.1396 0.3947 -
2-PNB 0.6579 0.9381 -
RLR 0.9513 0.9961 0.9973
KNN 0.6990 - 0.9549
DT 0.8448 - 0.9765
SVM 0.9385 - 0.9911
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Source Code Only 0.9513
Combined (Early Fusion) 0.9558
Combined (Late Fusion) 0.9577
Table 2.10.: Confusion table for late fusion method in S5
Actual class
True False
Predicted Positive 374 18
class Negative 15 4783
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3 USER COMMENT ANALYSIS FOR ANDROID APPS AND CSPI DETECTION
WITH COMMENT EXPANSION
3.1 Motivation
In this chapter, we introduce our work on how to extract security related topics from
user comments. User comment is an indirect source of information that reflects the expe-
rience of users in using the app. Before we can apply security analysis from it, we need
to first filter out the irrelevant comments which are the majority of all the comments and
detect the different security related issues discussed in user comments.
3.2 Introduction and Related Work
3.2.1 Introduction
New challenges come with the exponentially growing markets of mobile apps. On one
side, comparing to traditional software markets, markets like Google Play and Apple Store
have lower entering threshold for developers and faster financial payback, hence greatly
encourage more and more developers to invest in this thriving business. One result out of
this is the huge amount of mobile apps with great diversity. Therefore, to control the quality
of apps, especially the security risk of them across the whole markets becomes a important
issue to all that involved. On the other side, public concerns about privacy issues with on-
line activity and mobile phones are also elevating, demanding a mobile environment with
more respect to users’ privacy.
The infection rate of real malicious mobile apps over a market can only be estimated. It
is reported to be about 0.28% in [33]. The rest of them are assumed benign apps but are not
free of security issues. Manymisbehaviors of a mobile app may lead to real security/privacy
issues. For example, adding too much or inappropriate advertisement may lead to phishing
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and scareware; unresolved In-App-Purchase (IAP) may lead to fraud; unnecessary running
in background may be connected with unauthorized access to personal data.
User comments are valuable feedback for both new users and developers. Many secu-
rity/privacy issues can be revealed by user comments, including those which may not be
so easy to be discovered from other sources (i.g. unresolved IAP issue). However, most of
the negative comments are not necessarily Comments with Security/Privacy Issues (CSPI).
Some of them are non-informative comments [34], including vague statement and pure
emotional expressions. Others may be complaining about attractiveness, quality or even
cost of the app [35], which normally have nothing to do with security/privacy. In order
to make use of the comments to reveal the issues that are really related to security/privacy
of an app, CSPI need to be detected first to avoid all those irrelevant comments. This
paper provides a novel method to deal with this problem. A set of comments are first
collected and investigated. Based on observations from the comments, a two dimensional
label system is designed to describe CSPI from two different perspectives. With this label
system, a CSPI Detection with Comment Expansion (CDCE) method is proposed to first
use keyword-based filtering method to narrow down the scale of comments in concern, then
applies a supervised multi-label learning method to identify different types of CSPI.
The contribution of this paper are listed as following:
• Instead of using a list of label for different issues, this paper presents a two-dimensional
label system, picturing the “What” and “When” of the occurrence of a reported CSPI,
providing an additional dimension to better understand the relationship between dif-
ferent issues.
• A supervised learning method is proposed to solve this multi-label problem. Com-
ment expansion is adopted to utilize the relationship between comments and a post-
process for the relationship between labels. Both relationships are proven to be useful
in improving the CSPI detection performance based on the collected dataset.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2.2 describes related works. Sec-
tion 3.3 discuss the collection of data and the design of the label system. Section 3.4
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presents the method for CSPI detection. Section 3.5 demonstrates the evaluation process
of the proposed method. Section 3.6 lists the limitation of this paper with future work and
Section 3.7 concludes the paper.
3.2.2 Related Works
Many efforts have been done to reveal the security risk of mobile apps using information
other than user comments. Some works [1,4] utilize the permission required by the app for
this purpose, other use code analysis[], static and dynamic analysis are both investigated.
Although these works share the general purpose with this paper, they are not closely related
to this work. User comment are utilized by some works [34–36] to evaluate mobile apps.
Some researchers [36] aim at the task to extract new/changed requirement for new version
of the app. It proposes Aspect and Sentiment Unification Model (ASUM) to extract the
topics of comments. ASUM is an extension of Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) [37] by
incorporating both topic modeling and sentiment analysis. Another work [35] uses LDA
model to identify different topics from those negative comments, in order to provide insight
about why an app is getting low ratings. Our work focus on a finer level to investigate only
CSPI, which is part of the negative comments. Also, some researchers [34] propose a
novel method for extracting informative review topics from user comments. A filtering
process is applied first to filter out non-informative comments, then LDA is adopted for
generating topics from the informative ones. Our work also requires a filtering process,
but not from the perspective of the quality of information, but whether the comment is
related to security/privacy. All these works mentioned above make use of topic models
(LDA), which is an unsupervised method. For our work, the task is not to generate general
summarization of the topics of comments of an app, but to identify a specific part (CSPI) of
all the comments and further distinguish different types of it. Hence unsupervised method
like LDAmay not be able to generate the expected and specified types of topics. Therefore,
supervised method is adopted in our work, and a label system is manually designed to
provide precise task for the learning process.
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3.3 Data Collection and Annotation
The data used in this work is collected by crawling the Google Play website. Infor-
mation about 6, 938 free apps in Google play are downloaded during September through
December in 2013. For user comments, the total number of comments collected for these
6, 938 apps is 5, 108, 538. The average number of comments for an app in this dataset is
736 and the maximum number is 4500. Figure 3.1(a) shows the distribution of number of
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(b) Histogram for the number of
comments with different ratings
in the collected dataset.
Figure 3.1.: A simple view of the collected dataset.
The rating from user comments are highly skewed as shown in Figure 3.1(b) (this is
previously also reported in [35]), indicating that most of the comments are not complaining
about an issue. In addition, many of the comments with poor ratings (< 4.0) are not
really about security/privacy issues. As observed from the dataset, complains about the
functionality and quality (or attractiveness for Game app) take the majority. Therefore it
would be necessary to narrow down the huge set of comment to a more feasible size for
further analysis and annotation. In order to do that, a coarse filtering is applied first to create
a set of suspect comments. This filtering is keyword-based, as any comment that contains
at least one of the predefined keywords will be put into the suspect set. These keywords are
manually picked in an iterative way. The initial set of keywords is just {security, privacy}.
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New keywords are picked from those that have high co-occurrence probability with current
keywords. Comments with the co-occurrence are investigated manually to see how often
they are related to security/privacy issues. The final keywords set includes security, privacy,
permission, money, spam, steal, phish, etc.. To avoid mismatch, different forms of the
keywords are also considered, i.g. unsecure and insecure for security, stole and stolen
for steal etc. A rating filtering is also applied to only include those comments with poor
ratings(< 4.0). The resulting suspect set contains 36, 464 comments from 3, 174 apps.
3.3.1 CSPI Annotation
It is worth noting that the suspect set still contains not only CSPI. Many of them are
not CSPI, due to the simplicity of the keyword-based coarse filtering. Hence the suspect
set only serves as a base candidate set of comments which are suspect for CSPI. Further
effort need to be done to actually detect CSPI. And different types of CSPI need to be
distinguished and treated accordingly.
Various different issues are found from the comments in the suspect set. It would be ex-
hausting to distinguish each of them without abstract concepts by considering the relation-
ship between them. Also, it would be too vague to just distinguish CSPI from non-CSPI
comments without further insight of the actual issues. To make a trade-off between the
complexity and functionality of the annotation system for describing CSPI, a label Gen-
eral is firstly defined for comments that is in general CSPI. In addition, a two dimensional
(Nature, Scenario) label set is defined as shown in Table 3.1 to provide finer level identi-
fication for different CSPI topics. Among these labels, label Execution is a super label for
Foreground and Background. And all are sub-label of label General.
The two dimensions of label set serve as “What” (Nature) and “When” (Scenario) of
the underlining issues. The dimension Nature is used to identify the nature of the secu-
rity/privacy related misbehavior of the app complained by the comments. These behaviors
are normally described explicitly in the comments. On the other hand, the dimension Sce-
nario is used to identify the scenario when the issues occur. This is sometimes expressed
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implicitly in the comments. System, Privacy and Finance are clearly necessary as the direct
issues. The label Spam is assigned to the widely used advertising behavior among apps.
As a popular and common behavior, however, spamming is closely related some security
issues like phishing, scareware etc., hence is also included as one type of issue mentioned
in CSPI. The label Others is used for other issues not included in System, Privacy, Spam
or Finance. For example the topic about some apps that can not be normally uninstalled, it
is usually an app pre-installed by the vendor without any real issues, but it clearly violates
the users’ control over the phone and is complained about by many users. Another exam-
ple for Others labeled comments would be those claims that the app is reported by other
security apps for some reason. Since these are not direct opinions from the users but only
a suspects, they are put with Others, instead of with the other four ones according to the
reasons said to be reported by other security apps, which may not be true or even explic-
itly expressed in the comment. The label Before is mostly assigned together with Privacy
to indicating the complains about the permission required by the app, which is available
to the user before the installation. And the label After is mostly for the email/SMS spam
after uninstall. The label Execution stands for the most common scenario, and it is further
divided into two sub-labels: Foreground for the issues occur when the app is running in
foreground (occupying the screen) and Background for running in background. If the issue
in the comment is not specific about foreground or background, only the label Execution is
applied, otherwise both Foreground (Background) and Execution will be applied.
The suspect set is then annotated manually with these labels. Each label is validated by
the agreement of two people. Some statistics of the suspect set with respect to the labels
are shown in Table 3.2.
About 30% of the comment in the suspect set are labeled as CSPI. This also means
many of the comments, while mentioning some keywords, are not really talking about
security/privacy issues. The sample comment for Whole Set is one of them. It mentions
stolen not to claim a financial issue but a issue about stolen idea, which is not about security
or privacy. Some comments talk about “money”, but only to express that the app is not
worth it (Although all the apps we collected are free apps, people can still talk about In-
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App-Purchase and the paid version of the app.). Another example would be the comments
for the apps about security (Anti-virus apps, password manager, etc.). A lot of keywords are
mentioned in these comments since the apps are exactly about the issues, but the comments
are not necessarily reporting an issue of the apps. Similar things happen with Bank apps.
Label Others has a very low percentage, indicating the coverage of the four main natures
of issues is good.
It is worth noting that misspelling may hinder the performance of detection. The
“baught” in the sample for Finance serves as an example. Also of important is the fact
that a CSPI usually has two or more labels besides General. For example, the sample com-
ment for Spam is also annotated with Background, since it mentions that the spam appears
in the notification bar. And the one for Before is also annotated with Privacy.
3.4 Algorithm
The purpose of CSPI detection is to detect certain types of CSPI in the suspect set. This
is naturally a multi-label classification problem. Independent Logistic Regression (ILR) is
used as a baseline. The proposed CDCEmethod adds two improvements upon it: Comment
Expansion to embed similarity between comments and Post-Process with label correlation
to utilize label correlation.
3.4.1 Feature Extraction
To represent comments for detection, Bag Of Word (BOW) feature is extracted from
comment text. Proper pre-processes are applied to the text before feature extraction, in-
cluding removing stop words and stemming. The dimension of the BOW feature is tuned
by removing the rarest and most popular words. With the BOW feature and the annotation
with the 11 labels, the suspect set can be represented asX and Y . X = {X1, X2, · · · , XN}
is the set of the BOW feature vectors for each comments with N the number of com-
ments. And Y = {Y1, Y2, · · · , YN} is the set of label vectors for each comments with
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Yi = {Y 1i , · · · , Y 11i } and Y ji 2 { 1, 1} with Y ji = 1 indicating the presence of the jth
label for comment i.
3.4.2 Independent Logistic Regression (ILR)
There are many works that have been done on multi-label learning from different per-
spective. G. Madjarov [38] made an extensive empirical comparison of different multi-label
learning methods. In the comparison, Binary Relevance (BR) [39] performs similar to clas-
sifier chaining (CC) method [40]. Although not the best method among all the competitors,
BR shows robust performance and has the advantage of simplicity. For the task of CSPI
detection, this paper does not seek to investigate and improve the multi-label learning al-
gorithm in general. Therefore, ILR is chosen as the baseline, which is just BR framework
with LR [41] as the base classifier. LR is a widely adopted linear classifier due to its ro-
bustness and simplicity. To apply LR to the multi-label problem considering independence
between labels, one LR classifier is trained for each of the labels. The objective function
of ILR with 2-norm is as following:
min
wj ,bj









j Xi+bj)), j = 1, · · · , 11
where the NLL(X,wj, bj) is the negative log-likelihood function.   is the regularization
parameter which can be obtained by cross validation in training set. This optimization
problem can be solved using gradient descent.
3.4.3 Comment Expansion
User comments has some properties distinguishing them from properly compiled doc-
uments. They are normally short, with wrongly spelled words (as mentioned in Sec-
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tion 3.3.1) and made-up words (i.g. “spamspamspamspam”). Also, different words or
phrases may be used for the same opinion. These properties of user comments may harm
the performance of CSPI detection since the features may not fully represent the opinion
of the comments. This is in a similar situation with the user query in Information Retrieval
(IR) problem, where a query submitted to search engine could also be short, misspelled
and vary in the choice of words. Due to this motivation, a traditional IR technique called
query expansion with pseudo relevant feedback [42] is borrowed here to make comment
expansion. Originally, this technique uses the top documents in the retrieval result rank
list with respect to the original query as “relevant” documents, and use these document to
expand the original query, generating a new query resembling the “relevant” documents.
This query expansion is reported to almost always have a positive effect on the retrieval
performance [42]. A similar process can be adopted for comment expansion as following.
The comment expansion would have two steps:
1. Find “relevant” comments via retrieval.
2. Expand original comment with “relevant” comments.
The relevance between comments is hereby evaluated using the retrieval model. An in-
teresting question would be the scope of the retrieval. Should the candidate “relevant”
comments picked from all other comments? or just from the comments from the same app
or same category of apps? Besides, the “relevant” comments should only be those posted
before the underlining comment. To avoid making complicated query to the retrieval en-
gine, the query contains only the underlining comment with no constrain. A sufficiently
long rank list from the retrieval engine will be returned and the scopes and restrictions will
be applied to this list to pick “relevant” comments afterwards.
With a set of “relevant” comments, the comment expansion can be conducted by mak-
ing a convex sum of the original comment and the mean of the set of “relevant” comments
on feature level as following:





where fold is the BOW feature vector of the original comment, fnew the feature vector of the
expanded comment, and R the set of “relevant” comments with respect to the underlining
comment. ↵ serves as a tunable parameter for the degree of effect of the expansion, and
will be tuned in experiment for the best performance, so is the size of R.
Comment expansion is an efficient way to utilize the relationship between comments.
Other choices like kernel method may require the similarity computation between each
pair of comments, the amount of computation grows exponentially with the number of
comments. Comment expansion, on the other hand, relies on retrieval engine, and the cost
of retrieval for one comment is normally constant, hence the total cost of time is linear to
comment number.
3.4.4 Post-Process with Label Correlation
Label correlation is used in various ways in multi-label learning [38]. As mentioned
in Section 3.3.1, labels hardly appear alone. Hence the correlation between labels could
be a valuable source of information. For the CSPI detection task, a simple post-process
is applied to embed this information. The post-process uses a second round of ILR with
different feature for the comments. The probability output Yˆ of the first round ILR clas-
sifiers are used as feature in this second round of ILR to predict Y . And the correlation
matrix of the labels are utilized into a Laplacian norm [28] in these LR problems. Let
Yˆ = {Yˆi, · · · , YˆN} the estimated label vector set from the ILR. The objective function of
the second round LR is as following:
min
wˆj ,bˆj
NLL(Yˆ , wˆj, bˆj) +  ˆ(wˆj
TLwˆj + |bˆj|22)
with






T Yˆi+bˆj)), j = 1, · · · , 11
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where L = A D is the Laplacian matrix with A the correlation matrix of the labels Y in
training set, and D a diagonal matrix with its diagonal elements the sum of each row of A.
These optimization problems can be solved similarly using gradient descent.
3.5 Experiments
3.5.1 Experiment Setting
The evaluation of the proposed CSPI detection method is conducted under the suspect
set of comments. As a supervised method, a training set is required for training the model.
The suspect set is split in a 50/50 manner into a training set and a testing set. This splitting
is based on app level, so the comments for the same app can only be in training or testing
set altogether. The BOW feature vector is of length 13, 135 by removing those words with
less than 100 or more than 1, 000, 000 appearance (in number of comments) in training
set. Considering the hierarchy in label set, a comment labeled with a sub-label will be
considered a positive sample for a super-label as well. And a sample labeled with a super-
label will not be considered either a positive or negative sample for a sub-label. For the
baseline ILR, 5-fold cross validation is adopted for finding  s in training set and L-BFGS
quasi-Newton method [27] is applied for solving the optimization problems. For comment
expansion, TF-IDF feature with cosine similarity is adopted for the retrieval model and
Lemur1 as the actual tool for the retrieval. Time constrain is enforced to prevent comment
expansion with “future relevant” comments. Set constrain is applied to only allow expan-
sion within training/testing set respectively, and the indexes of retrieval model are built for
the two sets separately so that the model parameter like document number and IDF values
won’t interfere between sets. Three types of scope: All, App, Category are tested with
each label and a 5-fold cross validation is used to pick the best of the three in training set
for each label. Also, the mixture ratio ↵ and the size of “relevant” document set |R| for
the expansion are also fixed by the 5-fold cross validation in training set for each label
along with the scope. The size of |R| is selected from {1, 3, 5, 10}. For post-process with
1http://www.lemurproject.org/
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label correlation, the problem solving method is similar to the baseline ILR. The metric for
evaluation is micro F1 value. F1 value is the harmonic mean of Precision and Recall. And
micro F1 is computed across all sample and all label at once.
3.5.2 Results and Analysis
The comparison between the proposed CDCE method and the baseline in F1 value is
shown in Table 3.3.
The CDCE  method indicates the method using only comment expansion without the
post-process. The CDCE+ method indicates the method using comment expansion and
post-process on all labels. And the CDCE⇤ method indicates the method that pick the
models between CDCE  and CDCE+ by cross-validation for each labels. This evaluation
is based on 10 different training/testing sets splitting, and the reported micro F1 values are
the means over these ten settings.
By comparing CDCE  and ILR, the general improvement from using comment expan-
sion is obvious. The expansion makes comments “smoother” among similar comments
in feature level, and improves the performance of the classifiers against short comments
and those with misspelled words. For example, “ads” may sometimes be misspelled to be
“add”, the expansion adds similar comments’ feature into the underlining feature and the
feature dimension with respect to “ads” may not be zero anymore, hence the classifier can
capture this feature and tend to put the label “Spam” on the comment. On the other side,
the effect of expansion is not always positive for all samples. For example, for comments
about a Game app, many ones may be talking about “money” because they paid for some
item in the game but never got it. These comments should be labeled “Finance”. But one
comments for the same app may be just talking about how expensive that item is, hence not
worth the “money”. This one however, is not a CSPI. After expansion, this comment will
look much like the others hence be labeled “Finance” as well. Therefore a negative effect
of comment expansion is that it may silence some different voice that are making different
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points while using similar words like others. Nevertheless, the general effect of comment
expansion is obviously positive.
The difference between CDCE  and CDCE+ shows that the post-process does not guar-
antee an improvement for all labels. Hence CDCE⇤ method is propose to pick a better
model between CDCD  and CDCE+ for each label from training set. CDCD⇤ provides the
best performance among others.
A label level comparison between CDCE⇤ and ILR can be found in Table 3.4, where
CDCE⇤ appears to outperform ILR for all labels except After. The model behavior for label
After is different from others mostly due to lack of sample. There are only 36 samples to
be split into training and testing set, which practically makes the training of model insuffi-
cient and the comment expansion mostly uses comments with different labels as “relevant”
comments. Besides After, three labels:Before, System and Others do not pass the statistical
significant test at ↵ level 0.05, with p-value 8.2%, 5.5% and 8.1% respectively. Other than
these, the highest p-value is 0.9% from Finance.
The results of picking better model between CDCE  and CDCE+ are also shown in
the P.P. column of Table 3.4. It appears that all Nature labels are not suitable for the
post-process, but the Scenario ones get a boost based on the results in Table 3.3. The post-
process makes use of the ILR result as feature to predict a label. This prediction may be
improved by getting correlation information from other labels, but also suffer from poorly
predicted results from ILR. Important words (features) for the Nature labels are not so
diverse as those in Scenario. For example, for label Spam, no matter what Scenario la-
bel come with it, the comment would probably still use the words like “spam” or “ads”.
Similarly for Privacy there are “privacy”, “invade”, or “permission”. To distinguish Sce-
nario labels, however, different words are of importance under the condition of different
Nature label. If given Spam, Foreground is related to over-sized on screen ads, and Back-
ground most likely to notification bar spamming. On the other hand, if given Privacy,
Foreground may be related to phishing and Background to personal information stealing or
abuse. Hence the correlation information may be much more helpful for Scenario labels
than Nature ones.
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The scopes of retrieval in comment expansion for each label are listed in the Type col-
umn of Table 3.4. None of classifiers choose to use All comments as candidates for “rele-
vant” comments, and the scope of using the comments of the same App or same Category
(Cat.) of apps are both popular. The scope of All comments makes the “relevant” com-
ments too diverse and noisy and the expansion normally lead to some unexpected result.
One the other side, App and Cat. scope serves well, providing much high probability of
getting “relevant” comments with both similar text content but also similar topic of issues.
3.6 Limitation & Future Work
As a comment level analysis, one limitation of this work is that it does not provide a risk
assessment on the app level. How to evaluate the app’s security/privacy risk base on the
identification of CSPI would be an interesting work in the future. Another limitation comes
from the coarse filtering, where CSPI that do not contain any keywords could be left out by
the method. This may due to the variety of language itself or simply misspelling or using
made-up words instead of the keywords. Hence further research may lie on how to expand
the suspect set as a trade-off between computation overload and detection performance.
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, a supervised learning method is proposed to detect CSPI for Android
apps. This task is formalized as a multi-label learning problemwith a two dimensional label
system with respect to “What” and “When” of issues reported in CSPI. A coarse filtering
is first applied to narrow down the set of comments as suspect. Then comment expansion
is adopted to improve the representativity of the feature by making convex combination of
the original feature with those of “relevant” comments. Finally, a post-process is used upon
some of the labels to make use of the label correlation for further improvement. Experiment
results on the collected dataset shows statistical significant improvement in general against
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.3.: Experiment results on suspect set. † shows the statistical significance based
on ILR. It is computed over ten different random splits of the training/testing sets, using
one-tailed pair-wise t test with ↵ = 0.05.
method micro F1General Scenario Nature All
ILR 0.7962 0.6713 0.7032 0.7153
CDCE  0.8037† 0.6740† 0.7159† 0.7223†
CDCE+ 0.8004† 0.6814† 0.7096† 0.7225†
CDCE⇤ 0.8037† 0.6836† 0.7159† 0.7263†
Table 3.4.: Detailed comparison in label level. The † is computed at ↵ = 0.05 with one-
tailed t test among 10 different training/testing set splits.
Label F1 P.P. TypeILR CDCE⇤
General 0.7962 0.8037† No App
Before 0.6965 0.7012 Yes Cat.
Execution 0.7277 0.7358† Yes App
Foreground 0.4347 0.4689† Yes Cat.
Background 0.6674 0.6750† No App
After 0.1327 0.0882 No App
System 0.3991 0.4012 No App
Privacy 0.7264 0.7350† No Cat.
Spam 0.8181 0.8304† No Cat.
Finance 0.5238 0.5320† No Cat.
Others 0.0235 0.0384 No App
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4 MOBILE APP SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT: A CROWDSOURCING
RANKING APPROACH FROM USER COMMENTS
4.1 Motivation
With extracted security related topics from user comments, this chapter demonstrate
how we can utilize crowdsourcing algorithm and learning to rank to estimate security risk
of mobile apps. Two major problem answers here are how the aggregate security topics
from user comment level to app level, and how to estimate the security risk from that.
Figure 4.1.: Flowchart of security risk assessment from user comments. Given any app
(e.g., Facebook), the user comments are collected from Google Play Store. In
order to infer the security risk of apps, (1) crowdsourcing is used to accumulate user com-
ments into app-level features (shown as “feature extraction”,“auto annotation” and “crowd-
sourcing”); (2) learning to rank model is used to predict risk scores by utilizing these latent
features, where pairwise constraints are enforced between pairwise apps (shown as the rel-
ative risk levels of Youtube and Facebook).
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4.2 Introduction and Related Work
4.2.1 Introduction
New challenges come with the exponentially growing markets of mobile apps. On one
hand, comparing with traditional software markets, markets like Google Play and Apple
Store have lower entry threshold for developers and faster financial payback, hence greatly
encouraging more and more developers to invest in this thriving business. One result out
of this is the huge amount of mobile apps with great diversity. Therefore controlling the
quality of apps, especially the security risk of them across the whole markets, becomes
an important issue to all that involved. On the other hand, public concerns about privacy
issues with on-line activity and mobile phones are also elevating, demanding a mobile
environment with more respect to users’ privacy.
User comments are valuable information source for evaluating mobile apps’ security
and privacy aspects from users’ perspective. They are indirect source comparing with the
apps’ permission requests and binary code, yet they reflect users’ experience of and expec-
tation for the apps. After all, whether an app is risky for the users’ privacy depends on how
the users think about it.
However, user comments are noisy and diverse. And the distribution of user rating
shows that user tend to give positive feedback [35]. Therefore how to aggregate comments
from multiple users to assess the app would be an interesting problem. Two questions (Q1,
Q2) need to be answered for solving this problem:
Q1: In order to assess the app from its comments, a set of features of the app repre-
senting the security/privacy aspects need to be extracted from the comments. But since the
comments are noisy and usually not about security issues and sometimes even not about
any issues at all, the challenge is how we can trust the extracted features to truly represent
the app for its security risk.
Q2: Security/privacy risk is not an objective term. The risk score of an app will not
mean much to a user unless it is compared to other apps. Therefore a question raises: how
can we compute the risk score considering the relationship between apps?
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For the first question, we suggest building comment level features, then aggregate from
comment level to app level. We do not place full confident on the comment level features,
but on the app levels which could be learned from the crowds by evaluating the quality of
the comments, i.e., the expertise of the users. For the second question, we suggest adopting
learning to rank model, which can rank apps with respect to their risk scores based on the
annotated risk labels.
In summary, this paper presents a crowdsourcing ranking approach to solve the app
risk assessment problem from users’ comments. The main contributions are highlighted as
follows.
• To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first one that treats the inference of
security risk problem as a task of crowdsourcing problem from aggregation of user
comments.
• A novel 2-stage model is proposed, which can jointly learn the latent security labels
from user comments and automatically rank the risks of app based on these learned
labels as features. An effective alternative optimization algorithm is proposed to
solve the corresponding optimization problem.
• Extensive experiments on two real-world datasets show the substantial improvement
of our method, i.e., 6%–7% performance improvements when compared with other
state-of-the-art methods.
• Last but not least importantly, our approach can be easily extended for understanding
the websites’ popularity through users’ comments, such as inference of goodness or
badness of a restaurant from users’ comments on Yelp, or the quality of a product
on Amazon or ebay. Since the label system is arbitrary, one may use the same user




There has not been much work on risk assessment on mobile apps. Liu et al. [43]
presented a framework for estimating privacy score for users based on their participations
in social network, instead of mobile apps. Peng [1] utilized the permissions required by
the apps to classify benign apps from the malicious ones. WHYPER [44] predicted the
risk assessment of mobile apps based on analysis of the descriptions of apps from natu-
ral language processing perspective using first-order logic. Kong et al. [45] predicted the
permission required by mobile apps from descriptions. Frank et al. [46] analyze the permis-
sion request using unsupervised learning (i.e., boolean matrix factorization) to discover the
inherent cluster patterns of permission request. In addition, users’ privacy preference can
also be utilized in personalized mobile app recommendation [47]. However, none of the
above works evaluate the risk score of mobile apps from the perspective of user comments.
Our work provides a new angle for estimating the app security risks.
The discussion of crowdsourcing problem could be traced back 35 years ago [48]. The
main idea is to infer true label of a given item from the annotations of multiple annota-
tors/workers. These annotations are assumed to be of low quality and may contradict with
each other. Two-coin model [49] is proposed to model worker expertise, by considering
the probability that a worker labels an item correctly which follows two Bernoulli distri-
butions, one for the true positive label, and the other for negative. Minimax entropy is
adopted in [50,51] to model both users and items. The maximum entropy principle is used
to naturally infer both item confusability and worker expertise. Guided crowdsourcing [52]
is another direction of research, which uses artificial intelligence methods to coordinate
workers in crowdsourcing tasks, in order to ensure collective performance goals such as
effectiveness, cost or efficiency. Our task is not a traditional crowdsourcing problem, we
model the mapping from user comments to app-level latent true labels as a crowdsourcing
problem, treating user comments as labels from workers.
Learning to rank is a well studied problem. There are three paths for solving learn-
ing to rank problem. Point-wise approach (e.g., [53, 54]), computes the model loss from
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point-wise perspective, hence can be closely related to regression. In pair-wise approach
(e.g., [55–57]), the loss is defined on pair of samples instead of individual sample points.
For example, work [55] formalizes the pair-wise learning to rank problem as a maximum
margin problem, and can be solved by Support Vector Machine (SVM) [41]. List-wise
approach (e.g., [58, 59]), formalizes the loss function directly on rank list. Our work fol-
lows the pair-wise approach to rank apps based on their security risks, and evaluates the
performance of the proposed method using ranking evaluation metrics.
4.3 Algorithm Overview
4.3.1 Problem Formalization
Given a training set of nl apps: (a1, a2, · · · , anl), with their corresponding user com-
ments Xnl = (x1,x2, · · · ,xnl), and their corresponding risk scores S = (s1, s2, · · · , snl).
The task is to estimate the risk scores (snl+1, snl+2, · · · , snl+nu), for nu new mobile apps:
(anl+1, anl+2, · · · , anl+nu) with their corresponding user comments
Xnu = (xnl+1,xnl+2, · · · ,xnl+nu).
At the first glance of the problem, this can be solved using a standard supervised learn-
ing method. However, the challenge of this problem is how to represent the comments
from different users, and leverage the different users’ opinion into the security assessment
model. It is not straightforward how to amalgamate the comments from different users into
a reliable feature representation of apps. Moreover, note that security risk of a mobile app
is more of a relative concept than an absolute metric. It is more reasonable to talk about
security risk by comparing two apps, rather than assigning an absolute numerical value to
an apps. Therefore, ranking model is motivated to be introduced to measure the security
risks among different apps.
4.3.2 Approch Overview
Basically, our approach solves the mobile app risk assessment problem in two steps.
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  The first step is to generate features for each app from its user comments, which is
modeled as a crowdsourcing problem, where user comments are viewed as “annotations”
to the apps and the crowdsourcing results are viewed as features of each app. The goal of
this step is to compute the app-security level featuresY via the crowdsourcing model.
  The second step is to generate the risk score by utilizing these features Y generated
in the first step, which is modeled as a learning to rank problem, where the relative risk
score is computed.
  The above two steps can be done jointly to optimize the mobile app risk ranking
results.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the framework of app risk assessment process, the detail of which
is discussed below. Note actually the two key steps in our method (§4.2, §4.3) can be solved
individually, without any communication. The major drawback of separate treating is that,
the risk score is computed in one-shot using the obtained features from crowdsourcing,
and thus we cannot consistently improve the models with the learned better features and
adjusted risk ranking scores, and thus its performance may not work very well in practice.
Step 1: Feature Learning via Crowdsourcing
In order to capture the security risks of different apps, a set of security related labels
L = {L1, · · · , Lr} is defined to describe different security problems mentioned in user
comments X = Xnl
S
Xnu . Then for each user u’s comment from each app i: Xu,i(1 
u  m, 1  i  n), it is associated with several labels, where m is the number of users
and n = nl + nu. Comment examples for an app are given below:
—————————————————————
comment:Seemed ok, but the morning after signing in my account
spammed everyone on my contact list with junk mail from me...
could be a coincidence...




comment: Why does this need to send sms messages and make
calls? Updates not that timely. Uninstalling.
labels: before install, privacy
User: Jane Doe
—————————————————————
Motivated by our previous work [60], a set of classifiers is then trained for each label.
These classifiers serve as auto annotation tools that map the raw text of user comment of
each app to a list of security related labels in L. It is worth noting that, the auto annotation
process is applied to both training and testing set as pre-processing. For the rest of this
paper, D = Dnl
S
Dnu is denoted as the annotation results after pre-processing, i.e., labels
of the comments, instead of the raw comments X . Moreover, the annotated labels are
treated as annotated by different users in the context of crowdsourcing scenario.
More formally, for each user u w.r.t app i, its annotated comments du,i 2 {0, 1}r is
denoted as a r-dimensional set, D = [dui], i.e., du,i = {d1u,i, · · · , dru,i}, where r is the size
of label set, and d`u,i the binary auto annotation result of the `-th label for the comment
given by user u for app i, i.e.,
d`u,i =
8<: 1; if user u label app i as label `0; otherwise (4.1)
Given all the above labels D generated from raw comments of different users for each
app, we need to learn a mapping which automatically projects the comment-level labels
du,i = {d1u,i, · · · , dru,i}, 1  u  m to app-level security labels yi = [y1i , y2i , · · · , yri ], i.e.,
{du,i}! yi, (4.2)
for each app i w.r.t different user u. Written in a matrix-format, all app-level latent security
labels denoted asY 2 <n⇥r, where n is the number of apps, and r is the number of security
labels, and thusY = [y1;y2; · · · ;yn].
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In practice, user comments could come from various users with different preferences
and backgrounds. Sometimes, user comments could even be random and noisy. Thus,
it is not realistic to assume that all {d`u,i} values are accurate enough with high quality.
However, this is naturally a suitable situation for applying crowdsourcing algorithm, which
assumes the quality of user annotations are not high, and the latent true label (y`i ) could be
learned from crowds ({d`u,i}).
Step 2: Learning to rank to estimate the risks
By considering linear ranking model with projection w 2 <r, the security risk score is
computed by projecting the security annotated features yi using projectionw, i.e., hyi,wi,
which is viewed as the final ranking score for app i. By choosing a learning to rank loss
function, the task of step 2 is to find a suitable linear ranking model as:
min
w
f(w;Y,S) + ⌦(w) (4.3)
where f(w;Y,S) is the loss function involved with projection w, annotated labels Y and
risk score S, ⌦(w) is the regularization term to avoid over-fitting. Actually, f(w;Y,S) has
many choices, and it could be point-wise, pair-wise or list-wise ranking function; it could
use hinge loss, logistic loss, etc. Note that the latent security labels yi are used as features
in this step.
Note Ranking-Support Vector Machine (R-SVM) [55] is one of the state-of-the-art
learning to rank methods. We apply R-SVM model to solve the mobile app risk rank-









where Y` = {y1, · · · ,yn`} is the app labels obtained from training set in the first step, w
is a linear transformation which projects the features yi w.r.t app i to its corresponding risk
score si, i.e., si = yTi w, i 2 {1, · · · , n`}, e 2 <p is a vector with all ones,B 2 <p⇥n` is a
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sparse matrix which encodes the pairwise constraints, i.e., each row of B contains exactly
one +1 and one  1 with the rest entries 0. (x)+ = max(x,0), and replaces any element of
x that is less than 0 with 0, thus term k(e BY`w)+k22 is the hinge loss function. C is the
trade-off parameter which balances the loss function part and the model complexity part.
4.4 Mathematical formulation
4.4.1 Preliminary
We introduce the baseline methods that can be used to solve crowdsourcing problem in
step 1. For clarity purpose, we use the same notations as in our model.
a. Crowdsourcing with Majority Vote (CMV)







j,i. By thresholding y`i , CMV provides binary crowdsourcing result. How-
ever, for our problem, Y is used as features, hence the original y`i is preserved without
thresholding. One major problem with CMV is that it treats each user equally hence the
contribution of experts would be overwhelmed by crowds’ less valuable opinions.
b. Crowdsourcing via Two-coin for User (CTU)
The two-coin model [49] is used to model user behavior, and pays more credit on more
trust-worthy users. It assumes two coins for each user. A user would give positive label
to an item under the condition that the true label is positive in probability ↵ (sensitivity),
and he/she would give negative label to an item under the condition that the true label is
negative in probability   (specificity), i.e.,
↵`u = Pr(d
`
u,i = 1|y`i = 1), 8i 2 {1, · · · , n} (4.5)
 `u = Pr(d
`
u,i = 0|y`i = 0), 8` 2 {1, · · · , r} (4.6)
Parameter ↵ = [↵`u],   = [ `u] can be learned from training data using EM algorithm ac-
cording to Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) and y`i is then computed via Bayesian
rules.
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4.4.2 Proposed PCMC Model
The basic idea of the proposed PCMC is to amalgamate CTU and R-SVM together, by
taking advantages of both approaches. A straight forward objective function would be a














It consists two parts, negative log-likelihood of observations (Eq.(4.7)) using two-coin
crowsourcing model, and ranking function (Eq.(4.8)) using standard rank-SVM model.
In Eq.(4.7)1, ✓ = {↵,  } is the parameters as in Eqs.(4.5, 4.6), where ↵ denotes the
probability that a user will give positive label to an item under the condition that the label
is positive, and   denotes the probability that a user will give negative label to an item under
the condition that the label is negative. ln Pr(Dnl |✓,Y`) is the log-likelihood of observation












Pr(d`u,i|y`i = 1; ✓)
+ Pr(y`i = 0|✓)
mY
u=1
Pr(d`u,i|y`i = 0; ✓)
i
; (4.9)













i = 1|✓), P := [p`i ] (4.12)
1Y`,P` refer to the labeled apps, i.e., i = {1, 2, · · · , nl}.
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then p`i is the probability of label ` on app i, which we call “better features” as compared
to y`i , and can be optimized in our method. Clearly,
Pr(y`i = 0|✓) = 1  p`i . (4.13)
Pr(✓) is the prior probability for parameters ↵ and  , since ↵,   represent the probability
of a binary event, thus a natural choice is the Beta distribution. i.e.,
Pr(↵|a1, a2) = Beta(↵|a1, a2); (4.14)
Pr( |b1, b2) = Beta( |b1, b2); (4.15)
where a1, a2, b1, b2 are the parameters for Beta distribution.
In Eq.(4.8),Y` is the estimated annotated app labels in training set from raw comments
as in Eq.(4.2), w is the projection for ranking, B is the pair-wise constraint, e is a vector
with all ones, which are defined as in Eq.(4.4) in standard R-SVM model, and   a trade-off
parameter.
4.4.3 Alternating Optimization
The optimization of two-coin crowdsourcing model is a Maximum-A-Posteriori (MAP)
problem, whereas R-SVM model is a Quadratic Programing (QP) problem. The optimiza-
tion goals for MAP and QP are divergent. Moreover, Yl is output of the MAP but input as
feature of the QP, making both feature and model unknown for QP. Therefore we propose
an alternating optimization approach to approximate the optimum solution instead.
Alternating optimization [61] is an iterative procedure for minimizing each variable in-
dividually while fixing the other variables. Alternating optimization has been well studied,
and used in a wide variety of areas. Generally its convergence can be guaranteed. The
alternating optimization process for PCMC takes four sub-procedure in each iteration as
follows:
(1)Y` ! ✓, estimate model parameter ↵,   based on current estimation of app labels.
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(2)Y` ! w, estimate app ranking w, based on current app labels (as features).
(3) (w,Y`) ! P`, approximate better features P` based on current ranking model w
and app labelsY`.
(4) (✓,P`)! Yl, update app label estimations based on user model and P` as a prior.
The above four sub-procedures are iterated until the algorithm converges. Now we
investigate each of these sub-procedures respectively.
(1) Y` ! ✓: Given Y`, model parameter ✓ can be computed as those in standard two-







u,i + a1   1Pn`
i=1 y
`




i=1(1  y`i )(1  d`u,i) + b1   1Pn`
i=1(1  y`i ) + b1 + b2   2
, (4.17)
where prior ↵ and   follow Beta distributions, as defined in Eqs.(4.5, 4.6) and Eqs.(4.14,
4.15) with parameters a1, a2 and b1, b2, respectively.
(2) Y` ! w: This is the same as solving the R-SVM problem. The update on w with
Eq.(4.4) in the standard form of ranking SVM, hence can be solved as in [55]. The `2 norm
ofw in Eq.(4.4) can be viewed as a prior tow in the form of a standard normal distribution.
(3) (w,Y`) ! P`: In order to update Y based on the newly updated ✓ and w, an
approximation of a better feature representation of apps are generated based on current











s.t. P = [p`i ], 0  p`i  1 (4.19)
The first term in Eq.(4.18) indicates that P should fit the ranking modelw with constraints
Bwell, while the second term regularizes it to be an approximation ofY`. Where C 0 works
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as a trade-off parameter. This is a non-convex optimization problem with box constraints,
with the first derivative matrix given by:
@J(P)
@P
=  C 0BT ((e BPw)+)wT +P Y` (4.20)
Due to the non-convexity of J(P), only the local optimal is available for Eq.(4.18). But
since P is only used to get a better feature representation based on the ranking model
around true Y`, a local optimal around Y` is sufficient. Hence P is obtained as the local
optimal of Eq.(4.18) withY` as the initial point. Any gradient based optimization methods
which accept box-constraints, e.g., interior-point method, can be adopted here for the actual
computation.















where a`i is the likelihood of app i getting label `, b`i is the likelihood of app i not getting












Initial value The alternating optimization for PCMC requires initial values of Y`,
which can be obtained from either CMV or CTU.
Feature Augmentation A possible extension to PCMC is to use feature augmentation
on the security feature space (the label space). There are two reasons for this suggestion.
For one reason, the primal form of SVM is adopted in Eq.(4.4), hence the kernel method
is not directly applicable here. Therefore by utilizing feature augmentation, the model
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may gain nonlinear modeling ability over the original feature space. The other reason
comes from the multi-label setting. By using feature augmentation on the label space, the
linear ranking model can now capture correlations between labels. For example, if order-
2 polynomial feature augmentation is applied, co-occurrence of label pairs is captured in
the new feature space, and can be utilized by the ranking model to make use of the label
correlation.
Parameter Tuning Two parameters need to be tuned for the PCMC model. Both are
trade-off parameters. They are C 0 from Eq.(4.18) and C from Eq.(4.4). Grid search can be
used in cross validation 2 in training set for finding the best C and C 0. To avoid tuning both
parameter together, one may apply CTU and R-SVM separately, and run cross validation
to find C in the R-SVM model. Then we can apply this C directly in PCMC and tune
only C 0. It is worth noting that, in the original object function Eq.(4.8), there is a trade-off
parameter   which no longer exists when applying the iterative optimization, since its role
has been taken place by C 0.
4.4.5 Applying the Model to Testing Data
Given ✓,w as the trained model, and the test dataDnu . First apply Eq.(4.23) to getYu,












We evaluate the proposed PCMC method on two datasets. The D1 dataset is collected
from Google Play during May 2014, which contains 6, 526 apps. The D2 dataset is
collected also from Google Play during December 2013, which contains 6, 257 apps.
There are no overlaps for the above two datasets, since many new apps have been updated
on Google play. The details of number of comments and users are shown in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1.: Datasets details. The Mean, Max and Min are statistics for the number of
comments per app.
Data #app #comment #user mean max min
D1 6,526 6,021,244 2,614,186 923 4,020 1
D2 6,257 5,108,539 1,496,554 816 4,500 2
4.5.2 Label System
Motivated by our previous research [60], we use the same label system and labeled
dataset to train the classifiers as auto annotation tools. This label system contains 11 labels
with about 4k labeled user comments. These 11 labels consist of a general label for secu-
rity/privacy related issues and 10 finer labels divided into two groups. One group is about
the nature of the issues (system, privacy, spam, finance and others) and the other group is
about the scenario of the issues (before install, executing, foreground, background and after
uninstall). Logistic Regression (LR) [41] is used as the classifier and basic Bag-Of-Word
(BOW)3 feature is used as comment feature. Feature augmentation is adopted to leverage
the correlation between labels and the final label set consists of the original labels and each
pair of them (C211 = 55), making a r = (11 + 55) = 66 dimensional label set.
3http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bag-of-words model
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4.5.3 Methods in Comparison
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed PCMC method, we enlist four
other methods into comparison. These four methods come from combinations of two
crowdsourcing methods and two learning to rank methods in a separated two-step man-
ner.
The two crowdsourcing methods are CMV and CTU, while the two learning to rank
methods are Support Vector Regression (SVR) [62] and R-SVM [55] which are state-of-
the-art ranking methods. The CTU method here uses a fix prior p`i for each label while
the PCMC uses P. We also added a method that ranks the app by its user ratings only to
provide a baseline. Therefore the six methods in comparison are:
(1-4)CMV+R-SVM, CTU+R-SVM, CMV+SVR, CTU+SVR: These four methods train
crowdsourcing model (CMV or CTU) and learning to rank model (R-SVM or SVR) sepa-
rately. (5) Our method: Use PCMC to train CTU model and R-SVM model jointly.
(6) Ranking by Ratings.
Note methods mentioned in [44], [1] are not used for app risk ranking, thus we cannot
compare against them in our experiment settings. For ranking SVM, we apply the code
from Olivier Chapelle4, and LIBSVM [63] for SVR.
4.5.4 Evaluation Metrics
Since the task is defined as a ranking problem, we adopt Discounted Cumulative Gain
(DCG) and Normalized DCG (nDCG)5 as the evaluation metrics. Both DCG and nDCG
are computed with respect to a given positionK at the rank list. They also require relevant






Where reli is the risk score of the app at rank i. And nDCG is computed by normalizing




where IDCG@K is the DCG score of the ideal rank list at position K. And larger values
ofDCG@K and nDCG@K indicate better performance.
In the following experiments, the reli is provided by Android Guard6, an open source
software which can evaluate the privacy risk of an app by its permission and code analysis.
And higher reli means higher risk. These reli scores are used in nDCG for evaluation in
testing data, and also used for generating the pair-wise constraint matrixB for R-SVM and
PCMC in training. Also, they are used as target values in regression for SVR. It is worth
noting that, although the results from Android Guard are used in the experiment as ground
truth, the purpose of this work is not to achieve the functionality of Android Guard or other
tools. First of all, Andorid Guard uses the application binaries as input which is a marjor
difference from this work. Secondly, the choice of Android Guard is due to the novelty
of the proposed problem and lack of real risk evaluation from the user perspective. The
proposed methed may be adapted for new label system and risk scores as well.
We pick four position 5, 10, 15 and 30 to make point-wise comparison and also show
the trend of the metrics in the range of 5 to 30. These points are picked for the following
reasons: First of all, although the nDCG value will converge to 1 for any ranking function,
it has consistent distinguish ability for different ranking functions [64]. Therefore we only
need to evaluate the top rank list for comparison. Secondly, when nDCG is used in pure
ranking task (e.g., retrieval), it is popular to use nDCG@3,@5,@10. However, the risk
assessment is not a pure ranking task, we do hope to evaluation longer in the rank list,
hence K is extended to 30 and the trend of metrics on the range ofK will also be shown.
4.5.5 Results & Discussion
Table 4.2 show DCG and nDCG values at position 5, 10, 15 and 30 of the 5 methods




(a) Performance evaluation in D1 dataset with
DCG.
(b) Performance evaluation in D1 dataset with
nDCG.
(c) Performance evaluation in D2 dataset with
DCG.
(d) Performance evaluation in D2 dataset with
nDCG.
Figure 4.2.: Methods comparison based on DCG and nDCG.
On D1 datasets, PCMC outperformed the other rivals 7.02% (9.46% based on the sec-
ond best) in terms nDCG, and 17.06% (7.71% based on the second best) in terms of DCG
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(d) log(C) =  13, log(C 0) = 20, D2
dataset
Figure 4.3.: Convergence curve in D1 and D2 dataset.
On D2 datasets, PCMC outperformed the other rivals 6.83% (10.03% based on the
second best) in terms nDCG, and 19.07% (9.39% based on the second best) in terms of
DCG by making an average of all cases.
CTU+R-SVM performs the second best. The major improvement of of the proposed-
with their corresponding user comments PCMC over CTU+R-SVM comes from jointly
training of CTU and R-SVM together. When CTU and R-SVM are trained separately,
there is no guidance for CTU to distinguish different labels (latent features), and the latent
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features are generated independently. On the other side, by jointly training the two mod-
els, the ranking model makes feedback through Eq.(4.18) to P, and P to the CTU model
through Eq.(4.23). Notice that, Eq.(4.18) involves all latent feature dimensions jointly with
respect to w, which is the weight of each dimension in ranking model. Therefore, by
utilizing P as prior, the CTU model is not estimating the user expertise (↵,  ) for each
label independently any more, hence the training of CTU model is guided indirectly by the
pair-wise constraint of B in Eq.(4.4), and is able to provide a better ranking model.
For a finer comparison of the five methods in the two datasets, Figure 4.2(a), 4.2(b),
4.2(c) and 4.2(d) illustrate how DCG and nDCG change with the evaluation position K.
PCMC is observed to maintain an obvious advantage over its rivals in the selected range of
K. This advantage will decrease to 0 as K increases and the value of nDCG converges to
1.
Convergence of PCMC The convergence of PCMC is basically guaranteed by the
alternating optimization algorithm. Figure 4.3(a), 4.3(b) and 4.3(c),4.3(d) show the con-
vergence curve on both datasets with different parameter settings. Notice that, the big
different between the suitable value of C and C 0 comes from the difference of the regular-
ization terms in Eq.(4.4) and Eq.(4.18). kwk22 is the sum of squares of r = 66 elements,
while the kP  Y`k2F is the sum of squares of nr elements. Hence the proper C 0 is much
larger in order to balance between the hinge loss function and kP Y`k2F term.
4.6 Limitations
As a method that targets security issues, it would not be appropriated not to mentions
the limitations. This will provide a clearer view of the potential of the proposed method
and provide interesting future directions.
Security topic extraction There is still room for improvement for extracting security
topic from user comments. We are using bag of word model which ignores sentence
structure and certain natural language precessing technique would be helpful to get
more accurate extraction.
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Security risk scoreAlthough we can evaluate and compare the methods based on security
risk score, it is not an objective measurement which can be agreed on from different
perspectives. Some novel metric may be needed for the measurement of mobile app
security risk.
Comment spamming The proposed method estimates user credibility based on the as-
sumption that the overall opinion from all user comments should provide relative
reliable opinions to an app. However, in the situation of comment spamming, be-
sides the credibility of users’ comments, the integrity of the users themselves are
questionable, the proposed method will not be able to estimate use credibility as de-
signed, since it is possible that a large portion of the comments for an app are bias.
One possible direction for solving this would be taking the meta data of the com-
ments and the users into consideration in order to find out the patterns of spamming.
For example, whether large number of comments with similar contents are posted on
exactly the same time, or by users with similar user names, or by users register (or
downloaded the app) at the same time, etc. This will require support from the market
since much of the meta data is not publicly available. Previous works for email anti-
spam and Tweet anti-spam would provide good examples for further exploration in
this direction.
4.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose to utilize user comments to assess security risk of mobile
apps. This risk assessment problem is formalized as a two-step task with crowdsourcing
to learn the latent true security labels of apps, and learning to rank to provide risk scores
based on the true security labels. This is to the best of our knowledge the first work to make
mobile app security risk assessment in crowdsourcing and ranking perspective. By jointly
training both crowdsourcing and ranking model, the crowdsourcing model is guided by the
pair-wise constraint of ranking model and is able to estimate user expertise with the aware-
ness of importance and correlation of multi-label, therefore providing better performance.
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Experiment on two real-world datasets both with over 6k apps show substantial advantage
of the propose PCMC method over state-of-the-art methods. Moreover, by treating user
comments as crowd labels, this framework can be easily extended to other assessment task












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5 AUTORBF: AUTOMATICALLY UNDERSTANDING THE
REVIEW-TO-BEHAVIOR FIDELITY FOR ANDROID APPS
5.1 Motivation
In previous chapters, we discussed how we can extract security related topics from
user comments (Chapter 3) and how to use the topic labels to evaluate app security risks
(Chapter 4). In this chapter, we focus on four common security issues and evaluate how our
proposed method performs and more importantly, compare the results with code analysis
methods to find out the gap between them. We will revisit both the CDCE method and
PCMC method as we describe them as one integrated system as AutoRBF.
5.2 Introduction and Related Works
5.2.1 Introduction
Nowadays, people spent more time on using mobile apps on smart phones and tablets
because of the convenience they bring to people’s daily life. One of the reasons is that users
are able to enhance the mobile devices’ functionality via rich-featured third-party mobile
apps, which can be easily obtained from Google Play store and App Store. The number of
available mobile apps has increased dramatically in the past years. For example, in June
2014, App store had 1.2 million apps and a total number of 75 billion downloads [65].
Personalized service (such as targeted advertising) is possible on mobile devices when
users’ personal information such as contacts and user locations, is accessible by mobile
apps. However, disclosing personal information to mobile apps could lead to serious pri-
vacy concerns. Unfortunately most users are innocent to the sensitive information (e.g.,
device hardware information, user data, etc) that permission requests ask to access.
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Mobile app have exposed severe security risks, and they require the users’ private and
personal information. The mobile app can perform security-sensitive operations on the
mobile devices. The available metadata such as user reviews are helpful for analysis of
security related behaviors. From user perspective, it reflects the users’ perceptions and
expectations to mobile apps.
On Google Play, user reviews are public to all users (e.g., Fig.5.1). The user reviews
describe how the users think about the app, and give an idea of the security related is-
sues/behaviors during the running of apps, which we call “review-to-behavior fidelity”. In
this paper, the “behavior” we consider only refers to the security/privacy related behaviors,
which may cause severe security and privacy concerns for end users. In more detail, we
focus on four categories of security-related behaviors shown in Table. 5.1, which accounts
for more than 90% of all users’ complains. The reason why we view the user reviewers
as an important source to understand mobile apps’ behaviors is that whether an app has
exposed severe security risk or not actually depends on how the users think about it.
With the belief that the user reviews and behaviors should be consistent, we present
AUTORBF, a system that automatically identifies the reviews that reflect the security-
related behaviors both at review-level and app-level. AUTORBF can be applied in the
following scenarios.
• Users can automatically infer whether the app has security-related behaviors from
other users’ experiences and expectations.
• Mobile app developers are alert of users’ complain by taking the feedback from users,
and are aware of the security-related behaviors that the mobile app has displayed.
• The security-related behavior analysis can be helpful for risk assessment for mobile
apps, which can be used to improve the credibility of app rating scores in app mar-
kets.
However, in practice, in order to build a system which can automatically solve the
review-to-behavior fidelity problem, we need to solve the following challenges (C1-C3):
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C1: Review semantics We note in user reviews, most of user reviews are short, prop-
erly with wrongly spelled words and even made-up words. Moreover, different words and
expressions can be used for the same purpose. Therefore, it requires to gather enough
semantics from users’ review to understand the security-related behaviors.
C2: Security Concern Not all reviews reflect the security/privacy related concerns
(Fig. 3.1). Recent study from the distribution of user ratings [35] shows that users tend to
give positive feedback. Some reviews include vague and pure emotional comments, and
some reviews may complain about the quality, the price of app, which has few relations
with security and privacy concerns. Therefore, how to infer the security-related behaviors
from the crowded user reviews is still very challenging.
C3: Credibility of users The user reviews can be noisy and diverse. User reviewers
are coming from different users. Some users may not be responsible for their reviewers.
Some reviewers are not likely to report the security problem. Although users’ account are
associated with Google account in Goolge Play, still lots of reviews are non-informative.
How to distinguish different types of users, and make the app-level review results more
reliable?
To the best of our knowledge, none of the previous works have systematically solve
the above problems in the context of review-to-behavior fidelity. In this work, we design
and implement a system called AUTORBF, which automatically infers the security related
behaviors by considering the semantics of user reviews and aggregating the security related
behaviors from comment-level to app-level via crowdsourcing. In our system, the state-of-
the-art machine learning techniques are used to predict the security-related behaviors, and
bridge the gap between the user reviews and behaviors.
The contribution of this paper is summarized as follows.
• To address the challenge of Review semantics (C1), at user review level, we extract
the semantics from user reviews, and make a feature augmentation approach by ex-
pansion of features via exploring the “relevant feedback”, in which the correlations
and co-occurrence among different reviews are taken into account. In this way, the
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Table 5.1.: Security/privacy-related behaviors
index Category Behavior Descriptions
1. Spamming Ads in notification bar,
ads via email, ads via
SMS, Pop-up ads, Fish-
ing, etc
2. Financial Paid for In-App-
Purchase (IAP), but do
not get the item, free to
premium, etc
3. Over-claimed Permission Request too much per-
missions than users’ ex-
pectations





















Figure 5.1.: Infer the security-related behaviors from users’ reviews. Overview of the framework
of AUTORBF : (a) Engine 1: Review-level security behavior inference engine; (b) Engine 2: app-
level security behavior inference engine.
security-related behaviors are captured even if they are described in different phrases
and expressions.
• To address the challenge of Security concerns (C2), we build a classifier which can
automatically learn the four categories of security-related behaviors (Table 5.1) based
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on the state-of-the-art sparse machine learning technique. As long as enough train-
ing user reviewers with labeled security-related behaviors are given, our system can
automatically infer the behavior of mobile apps related to security concerns with
accuracy as high as 94.05% at user-review level.
• To address the challenge of user credibility (C3), based on the extracted review-
level semantic features, we aggregate the security behavior annotation result from
review-level to app-level based on the expertise of different users. We do not put full
confidence on all the users, and the wisdom of crowds are automatically learned via
state-of-the-art crowdsourcing techniques.
We believe that AUTORBF system provides a generic and universal framework for
analysis of user reviewers with enhanced semantic understanding of security-related be-
haviors. Also, this framework could be easily extended to analyze the security/privacy
issues on the reviews appeared in other webistes, such as Yelp, Amazon, and ebay.
Since the label system we use to infer the security-related behaviors is arbitrary, one may
use the same user review data with different label system to evaluate the security/privay
aspect of the other product.
We further have the following interesting discoveries:
• Measurement Our evaluation on 19, 413 reviews, 3, 174 apps demonstrates that AU-
TORBF can accurately predict the review-level security related behaviors with ac-
curacy as high as 94.04%. As compared to the other approaches, our work excels a
large margin with 51.36% in accuracy, as opposed to a baseline using key-word based
approach, which further validates the effectiveness of system design and algorithm
deployment.
• Evaluation We also make a case study to analyze the difference between behaviors
inferred from AUTORBF and those from code analysis. Our findings include: on
67.5% apps, code analysis detected same spamming behavior result as that of AU-
TORBF; on 58.5% apps, code analysis discovered over-claimed permission and AU-
TORBF also found the over-claimed permissions than users’ expectation; on 73.5%
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apps, code analysis detected the “data leakage” issue while AUTORBF agreed.
However, for “financial-related” issue, almost no code analysis can find the same se-
curity issue as AUTORBF. This suggests that user reviewer analysis from meta-data
complements the works about the security-related behaviors analysis from code anal-
ysis, which provides an alternative way to look at the mobile app security concerns
from user perspective. We believe that the combination of them in an appropriate
way will definitely help to understand the app security issues better. Our empirical
result about users’ credibility suggest users have different preference in reporting the
security issues.
The remainder of paper is organized as follows. Section 5.3 presents the problem state-
ment. We introduce the detailed design of AUTORBF system in Section 5.4, followed by
the design of review-level security behavior inference engine in Section 5.5. Section 5.6
presents the design of app-level security behavior inference engine. Section 5.7 presents the
experimental evaluation of our system, followed by discussions of difference against code
analysis in Section 5.8. Section 5.2.2 discusses the related work and finally Section 5.9
concludes the paper.
5.2.2 Related Works
Since the initial intrusion detection work done by Lee et al. [66], machine learning/data
mining has been widely in a number of efforts to solve security problems, such as net-
work failure analysis [67], worm signature generation [68], malware classification [11],
software plagiarism detection [69], etc. Recently, machine learning has been used to un-
derstand the mobile app permissions and behaviors through analysis on the meta-data like
description [44] [70], permission usage patterns of mobile apps [46], and contextual API
dependency graphs [71], etc. In contrast to these works, our study focuses on analysis
of mobile app behaviors from the users’ reviews, a new angle of meta-data crawled from
google play store, which aims to automatically infer the behaviors of mobile app at both
review-level and app-level. Even if we treat the user review understanding problem as a
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machine learning problem, the approach in this work is unique: we consider semantics of
users’ reviews when automatically infer the security behavior of mobile apps; moreover,
rather than simply aggregating all the review-level security issues to the app-level, we use
crowsourcing as means to capture different users’ expectations for security resources from
review-level to app-level. Experiment result tells us that not only we achieve high accuracy
at review-level security behavior inference, but also we get clues for credibility of different
users.
Most (if not all) existing works on analysis of mobile app risks from meta data focus on
descriptions of mobile apps [44] [70], which are provided by developers. For example, in
order to analyze the app’s business aspects, Harman et al. [72] use a light-weight text ana-
lytic technique to mine the description, pricing of apps, etc. WHYPER [44] predicts the risk
assessment of mobile apps based on analysis of the descriptions of apps from natural lan-
guage processing perspective using first-order logic. AUTOCog [70] uses natural language
technique and machine learning based approach to access the description-to-permission fi-
delity of mobile apps. Compared to description of mobile apps provided by developers, the
user reviews studied in AUTORBF provide the real needs and expectations of users.
Recently, Lin et al. [73] introduce a new model for privacy by capturing users’ expec-
tations via crowdsoucing, where the users’ expectations of mobile apps are captured from
user study rather than the user reviews published at Google play store by millions of users
across the world as in AUTORBF. We believe the user reviews automatically analyzed by
AUTORBF can be used as good evidence for quantitative analysis of users’ security be-
haviors. AR-Miner [34] is one of the few works that analyzes the user views from Andriod
market, the goal of which, however, is to discover the most “informativee” user reviews
rather than understanding the security behavior as in AUTORBF. WisCom [35] analyzes
the inconsistency in user reviews but not for solving security issues as in AUTORBF. The
other work about the user review analysis [60] can be viewed as an intermediate step in
our comprehensive framework of AUTORBF, the capability of which has been greatly
enhanced.
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Notice that in the field of mobile app analysis, there exist many works on permission
analysis [4] [15] [1] [74], code analysis [14] [7] [75] [76] and run-time behavior analy-
sis [77] [78] [79] [80] with the purpose of detecting the app behaviors especially for mobile
app malware analysis. For example, Enck et al [79] use dynamic taint analysis to analyze
how users’ private information is misused. While permission analysis, static analysis and
dynamic analysis enable the detection of misused permissions, unauthorized actions, po-
tential data leak, etc, these approaches, however, analyze the objective behavior of apps
without giving enough consideration for the users’ real expectations for different mobile
apps. They did not bridge the gap between what the code really does and what the users’
really need. In contrast, AUTORBF automatically analyzes the users’ review and under-
stand what the users’ concerns for security issues, which can be used as a complementary
tool for the other code-based approaches for improved user experiences and interaction
with mobile apps.
5.3 Problem Statement
Android is the most popular smartphone operation system, and the availability of apps
in Google play store surpassed 1 million apps in July 20131. User reviewers are provided by
different users after they use or install the apps, which offers the valuable feedbacks for new
users and developers. From the security point of view, user reviewers indicate the users’
expectations and concerns for different behaviors. User are known to be very concerned
about the security-related behaviors on mobile apps [81]. As is sharply observed in Felt et
al. [82], automatically understanding the security behaviors from meta data is not an easy
job for most of the users.
Our goal in this paper is to predict the mobile app security-related behaviors from dif-
ferent users’ reviews, which we call “review-to-behavior” fidelity. Fig.5.1 illustrates the
overview framework to evaluate the security-related behaviors from user reviews.
1http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google Play
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User reviews provide users’ perception for mobile app behaviors, which we aim to use
and identify the most pertinent information that correlates the security concerns. Different
from the mobile app permission or behavior analysis through static or dynamic analysis
( [79], [80], [83], etc), infer the security behaviors from the users’ expectations is still
lacking. The AUTORBF tool developed by us can be deployed as an individual app or
deployed at Google play markets, which can automatically summarize and alert the users
about the security-related behaviors based on users’ experiences and expectations. The
tool is also expected to help to improve the trustiness of the overall Android app market
and make the Android echo-system better.
Several examples of user reviewers on Google play store are shown below.
• Review 1: “Good App but keeps granting itself super user permissions randomly when its
suppose to always have it.”
User: A Google user
• Review 2: “Seemed ok, but the morning after signing in my account spammed everyone on
my contact list with junk mail from me...could be a coincidence...”
User: J.S 1
• Review 3: “Why does this need to send sms messages and make calls? Updates not that
timely. Uninstalling.”
User: J.D
After carefully examining the user reviews, we found that most of the user reviews
are not complaining about the security-issue, not to mention security-related behaviors.
The scope of this paper is to infer the “security-related” behaviors from the user reviews.
More specifically, we focus on the four categories of security-related behaviors listed in
Table. 5.1. The listed four categories of behaviors cover more than 90% of security issues
appeared in mobile app markets, and viewed as critical security issues. For example, the
security behaviors inferred from the above three reviews are shown below.
• Review 1: Over-claimed permission
1Due to privacy reason, we list user name using the first letters of family name and first name.
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• Review 2: Data leakage, background spamming
• Review 3: Data leakage
Note the defined four categories of security-behaviors reflect the users’ understanding
and perception on different mobile apps, in a very coarse-grained manner. Considering that
most of the users are not professional developers, the user reviewers generally indicate the
high-level understanding of privacy concerns from very vague, emotional reviews instead
of very professional communication approach as in fine-grained permission control. Thus
in the security-related behavior definition, we use a very coarse-grained behavior to cover
each category of security issue, which corresponds to a group of fine-grained security-
sensitive behaviors illustrated in Table 5.1.
As illustrated in Section 5.2.1, we need to address the three challenges in the design of
our approach, which includes review semantics, security concern, and user credibility. We
design and implement the system AUTORBF , which addresses the above challenges. The
design goal of AUTORBF is to answer the following question: given user reviews from
different users on apps, can AUTORBF automatically infer the security-related behaviors
of apps? And how accurate is it? AUTORBF can help users to be aware of security
related issues, and discover the correlations between user reviews and security issues. With
the help of state-of-the-art sparse machine learning techniques, AUTORBF can achieve
the accurate prediction of app behavior both at review level and app level. Besides, the
training process works directly on user reviews, and the whole process can be automatically
done without human intervention given enough training user reviews and security-related
behaviors.
5.4 Overview of System Design
Fig. 5.1 illustrates the overview of system AUTORBF design, which includes two key



































Figure 5.2.: The framework of review-level security behavior inference engine (solid lines are used
for the training process, and dashed line for the process of annotating new user reviews).
rity behavior inference engine (ALI). Fig. 5.2 and Fig. 5.3 give the detailed introduction of
each engine, respectively.
Given the users’ reviews, by taking the advantage of the state-of-the-art machine learn-
ing techniques, the output of the review-level behavior inference engine, is review-level
security behavior labeling results (i.e., four categories of security behavior labeling shown
in Table 5.1) corresponding to each review.
Then the review-level security behavior labeling are fed into the app-level behavior in-
ference engine, with the help of the state-of-the-art crowdsoucing techniques, the output of
the app-level security behavior inference engine is the app-level security behavior labeling
results in consideration of users’ credibility. Although it appears similar to the review-level
security behavior labeling and also denoted as four categories of security issues shown in
Table 5.1, it actually labels the behaviors of an app by aggregating all different reviewers’
opinions via utilizing the wisdom of crowds. We will illustrate the detailed design of each
engine in Section 5.5 and 5.6, respectively.
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5.5 Review-level Security Behavior Inference Engine (RLI)
The goal of the review-level security behavior inference engine is to infer the review-
level security behavior labels from the descriptions of reviews. Given enough training user
reviews, the review-level inference engine (RLI) can automatically label the user review to
a specific security behavior category.
The overview of RLI engine is depicted in Fig. 5.2, which consists of two key phases:
training phases (denoted in solid line in Fig. 5.2) and testing phases (denoted in dash line
in Fig.5.2). In training phase, state-of-the-art machine learning techniques are used to
learn a model/classifier which can annotate the user reviews automatically, while in testing
phase, new user reviews are fed into the classifier, and the security related behaviors are
automatically labeled.
5.5.1 Training Phase vs. Testing Phase
The training phase includes the following three key steps.
Step 1: Security-related feature extraction and selection. To infer the security re-
lated behaviors, we first extract the features (including words and phrases) that have close
relations with four categories of security concerns. This is to address the challenge C2,
because it has been observed from the user review dataset that the complains about the
functionality, quality and the attractiveness for mobile apps account for the majority of
user review concerns. We use a key-word based approach to select the security related
words and phrases appeared in user reviews. After Step 1, only security related features are
preserved and selected, and will be used to build a classifier for labeling user reviews.
Step 2: Semantic Expansion. To address the challenge C1, this step concerns how
to understand the user reviews described in different words and phrases but for the similar
or the same meaning. By taking advantage of “relevance feedback” technique [42] in in-
formation retrieval, we find the relevant words/phrases related to security-related features,
and expand the original review features by adding new “relevant” words and phrases. This
process is iterated until all the “relevant” features are added to the review feature sets. This
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process is also known as “feature augmentation”. We aim to capture the semantics of user
reviews as much as possible by utilizing the relations among different user reviews. Af-
ter this step, each user review is abstracted into a feature vector denoted as a bag of word
(BOW).
Step 3: Training classifier using sparse machine learning. To address the challenge
C1, once we have obtained the BOW features after semantic expansion, we train the clas-
sifier for prediction of each category of security-related behavior. Our framework is open
to any classifier that, in order to classify a new user review, requires the BOW feature as
the training samples. Such classifiers include the kNN classifier, SVM classifier, etc. In
our approach, we use the state-of-the-art machine learning classifier (i.e., sparse SVM)
by exploring the structural sparsity of feature space, which has shown the state-of-the-art
performance.
Testing phases The output of the training phase is an automated user review classifier.
Given new user reviews, we first extract and select the word/phrase features related to se-
curity concerns, and then generate BOW features. Next, we feed the features to the trained
sparse machine learning classifier and automatically determine the security behavior cate-
gory.
Our framework does not require any human intervention. In a dynamic environment
where we have new user reviews, we repeat the process by retraining the sparse machine
learning classifier. In the next few sections, we shall elaborate on the technical details of
each of the above steps.
5.5.2 Security-related Feature Extraction and Selection
In this section, we focus on the extraction of the security-related features. Proper per-
processing are applied to user reviews before feature extraction, including removing stop
words and stemming. Since many user reviews are not related to security concerns of
mobile apps, a necessary step we need to take is to narrow down the huge number of user
reviews to a more feasible set for further analysis and annotation. To achieve this purpose,
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a coarse-grained filtering is firstly applied to create a subset of suspect user reviews. We
adopt a key-word based approach to preserve a set of the suspect user reviews, i.e., any user
review that contains at least one of the predefined key words will be put into the suspect
set.
The key words are manually picked in an iterative way. The initial set of the key words
are set to {security, privacy}. Then the new key words are selected from those that have
high co-occurrence with the current key words. The co-occurrence of key words in user
reviews are computed based on the user review corpus L (see Section 5.7.1) we collect on
Google Play. If the co-occurrence of the word-pairs exceeds a large threshold and one of
the word-pair in the suspect set, we add the other word into the suspect set. The rational
behind this approach is that these key words reflect users’ concerns for the security and
privacy issues. This process is iterated until no more new key words are added into the
suspect set.
To avoid mismatch, not only the synonyms are considered, other forms of the key-
words (e.g., antonyms, mismatch words, etc) are also taken into account. For example,
insure and unsure are added for key-word “security”, stole and stolen are added for key-
word “steal”, etc. We call these words as “security-related” features which captures the
semantics of the security behaviors for mobile apps. Note in this step, instead of using
the traditional black-box feature selection methods such as F-statistics [84] mutual infor-
mation [85], etc, that rely too much on the statistical property of the data, our method can
be viewed as a semantics-aware feature selection approach, which identifies the security-
related key words by considering the semantic meaning and correlations among different
key-words in a white-box way.
5.5.3 Semantic Expansion
User reviews have some properties which have significant difference from the properly
edited documents. User reviews are normally short, probably have wrongly spelled words
(as mentioned in Section 5.5.2), or even made-up words (such as “privasy, nonsecure”).
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Moreover, different words or expressions may be used for the same meaning. These prop-
erties may harm the performance of classifier if the extracted key-words from Section 5.5.2
are directly used for features.
It seems very challenging to solve this problem. We get our idea from information re-
trieval domain. In information retrieval, the query submitted to the search engine could be
short, misspelled and vary in the choice of the words, which is very similar to our situation.
For the same motivation, a traditional technique called query expansion with pseudo rele-
vant feedback [42] in information retrieval is borrowed to make review expansion. Origi-
nally, this technique uses the top document in the retrieval ranking list with respect to the
original query as “relevant” documents, and these documents are further used to expand the
original query, generating a new query resembling the “relevant” documents. This query
expansion is reported to always have a positive effect on the retrieval performance [42].
A similar process is adopted for review semantics expansion as follows. The process
consists of two steps: (1) find the “relevant” reviews; (2) augment the “original” reviews
with “relevant” reviews. The relevance between the user reviews is evaluated using the
similarity in the standard information retrieval model, i.e., cosine similarity between the
tf-idf features of the reviews.
An interesting question would be the scope of the retrieval. Should the candidate “rele-
vant” reviews picked from all other reviews? Or just the reviews from the same app or the
same category of apps? Besides, the “relevant” reviews should only be those posted before
the reviews for expansion, so we are not using the “future” reviews to extend the current
reviews. A sufficiently long ranking list from the retrieval engine will be returned and the
scopes and restrictions will be applied to this list to pick the “relevant” reviews afterwards.
With a set of “relevant” reviews, the review expansion can be conducted by making a
sum of the original reviews and the mean of the set of “relevant” reviews on feature level as
follows: fnew = (1  ↵)fold + ↵ 1|R|
P
fexpand2R fexpand, where fold is the Bag of Words (BOW)
feature of the original reviews, fnew is the feature vector after the expansion of user reviews,
fexpand is feature vector for the expanded user reviews, and R is the set of the “relevant”
reviews with respect to the reviews for expansion. ↵ serves as a tunable parameter for the
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degree of effect of the expansion, and can be tuned for the best performance, and so is the
size of R.
In summary, review expansion is an efficient way to explore the relationship among
reviews, and incorporate more semantics into the review understanding process. The re-
view expansion also relies on the retrieval engine, the cost the which is normally constant.
Hence, the total cost of review semantic expansion is linear to the number of user reviews,
which makes it more applicable in solving practical problems.
5.5.4 Sparse Machine Learning Classifier
After obtaining the BOW feature from the above steps, now we are ready to present the
classifier which is designed to label the user review as certain security-related behavior de-
fined in Table. 5.1. More formally, given the BOW feature and the annotated four categories
of labels, the suspect user review datasets can be represented as X = [x1,x2, · · · ,xn],
where xi 2 <p denotes the BOW feature vector for each user review, n is the number of
user reviews. Let Y = [Yik](1  i  n, 1  k  K) be the label vectors for user reviews
and Yik 2 {0, 1} with Yik = 1 indicating the presence of the j-th label for user comment
i. In our problem setting, K = 4 denotes the number of security-related behavior labels
defined in Table. 5.1.
In our problem setting, more than one security behavior categories can be simultane-
ously assigned to one user review (as shown in Section 5.3). This is known as multi-label
learning in machine learning community. To solve this problem, we use state-of-the-art
machine learning methods to solve this problem. Meanwhile, we hope our approach can
work well on large-scale user review dataset. To satisfy this goal, we use the linear clas-
sifier, where the output classification decision is simply a weight vector that separates the
data points in the high-dimensional space.
Since support vector machine (SVM) has shown the state-of-the-art performance in
solving many real-world text mining classification problem, we use SVM with linear ker-
nel as the base classifier for solving the multi-label learning problem. More specially, we
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use the multi-class SVM with linear kernel to solve the behavior categorization problem.
We use linear SVM also due to its simplicity, scalability and interpretability. For the ex-
act same reason, SVM classifier has been widely used in large-scale malicious web-site
detection [86] and drive-by-download attack detection [87], etc.
As in traditional SVM classifier, we use hing loss as the loss function, and enforce the
structural sparsity on feature space with LASSO regularization [88]. Meanwhile we con-
sider the label correlations among different behavior categories (e.g., data leakage category,
over-claimed permissions, etc). Given a set of n labeled data points {xi,yi}ni=1, the goal of







mxi)+ + ↵⌦1(W) + ↵⌦2(W), (5.1)
and ⌦1(W) =
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(D   S)ijwj = Tr(WTLW), where
the first term is the standard hinge loss function, the second term ⌦1(W) is the struc-
tural sparsity term which enforces the structural sparsity, and for i = 1, 2, · · · , n, m =
1, 2, · · · , k, W = [w1,w2,wk], where (x)+ = max{x, 0}, and the third term ⌦2(W) is
added to eliminate the label correlations for different categories.
The first term measures how data is fit into the model given the separating surface
W, which is directly minimizing the training error. The second term regularization is
a penalty for projection W using `1,1-norm especially when W is large. Similar to `1
regularization term, `1,1 regularization tends to yield sparse weight for projection matrix
W, i.e., a relatively few feature weights are set to zeros. Parameter ↵ controls the trade-
off between the loss function term and regularization terms (i.e., second and third terms):
a large ↵ value will give the second and third term of Eq.(5.1) more weight relative to
the first term of Eq.(5.1), and hence yield a more sparse solution of W. The third term
⌦2(W) is to eliminate the label correlations for different categories. One key observation is
that some categories of security-related behaviors co-occurred frequently, thus the ⌦2(W)
regularization term is used to capture the relatedness between different labels. More details


























Figure 5.3.: The framework of app-level security behavior inference engine: infer the app-level
labeling via crowdsourcing.
As solving the standard lasso problem, the iterative shrinkage method and L-BFGS
quasi-Newton method [27] are applied for solving the optimization problem of Eq.(5.1).
The convergence of the algorithm can be rigorously proved as that in [27].
5.6 App-Level Security Behavior Inference Engine (ALI)
The review-level security behavior inference model has annotated each review as 4
categories of security behaviors shown in Table. 5.1, which map the raw user review of
each app to a list of security labels. For example, take the mobile app “Pandora” as an
example,
user R. L.1 : ads. ; user N. O.: ads. ; user B. B: data leakage ...
Different users have labeled the same apps in different labels. A natural question that
follows is: what the final label at app-level in consideration of all users? We suggest using
the crowdsourcing techniques to aggregate the security-label from the user review level to
app-level. Crowdsourcing [49] is a technique to infer the true labels of a given item from
the annotations of multiple annotations/works, where the annotations are assumed to be
low quality and may contradict with each other. Although there may be substantial dis-
agreement among different annotators, we aim to learn from “crowds” to annotate the app
by considering different opinions. Note our task is not a traditional crowdsourcing prob-
1For privacy reason, we use the first letters of the first name and family name of the author.
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lem, in which we model the mapping from user-reviews to app-level latent true labels as a
crowdsourcing problem, treating each user review labels as labels from works/annotators.
More formally, solving the app-level annotation problem by different users can be de-
scribed as follows in the context of crowdsourcing scenario. For each user u with re-
spect to app i, its reviews du,i 2 {0, 1}r is denoted as a r-dimensional set (r=4 in our
case) corresponding to 4 categories of security-related behaviors shown in Table. 5.1, i.e.,
du,i = {d1u,i, · · · , dru,i},where r is the size of label set, and d`u,i is the binary auto annotation
result of the `th classifier for the review given by user u to app i, i.e.,
d`u,i =
8<: 1; if user u labels app i as label `0; otherwise (5.2)
Given all the above labels du,i generated from different reviewers for each app i, we
need to learn a mapping which automatically projects the review-level labels
du,i = {d1u,i, · · · , dru,i}, (1  u  m) to app-level security labels yi = [y1i , y2i , · · · , yri ], i.e.,
{du,i} ! yi, where each y`i corresponds to one security behavior ` described in Table. 5.1
for app i.
5.6.1 Why Not Majority Voting?
One naive way is to treat all the users equally, i.e., simply trust all the users and combine
all the reviews’ comments no matter they are trustful or not. For example, if most of the
users say this app has “data-leakage” issue, then we say this app has “data-leakage” issue.
This is known as majority voting [49] in crowdsourcing.
To treat every user equally by averaging over the label of each user, the final label for






j,i computed from users {1, 2, · · · , j, · · · ,m}.
By thresholding y`i , this method provides binary crowdsourcing result. One major prob-
lem with this method is that it treats each user equally hence the contribution of experts
would be overwhelmed by crowds’ less valuable opinions. In practice, some users are more
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trustworthy while others may not be very responsible for their reviews, or even fraudulent
or deceptive.
5.6.2 Crowdsourcing by Giving More Credit to Trustworthy Users
In this paper, we use a two-coin [49] model to annotate the apps from user-review
level to app-level, which pays more credit on trustworthy users. More specifically, the
probability that a worker labels an app correctly is assumed to follow Bernoulli distribution,
one for the true positive label, and the other for negative. The major advantage of this
approach is that we can give a more accurate prediction of the security behavior for each
app by taking into account the credibility of difference users.
There are two cases. For a specific app i, we use ↵`u to denote sensitivity, i.e., a user u
would label this security behavior ` in an app under the condition that the security-behavior
` really exists; and we use  `u to denote specificity, i.e., a user u would give negative label
with respect to security behavior ` in an app under the condition that the security-behavior
does not exist. Using mathematical formulation,
↵`u = Pr(d
`
u,i = 1|y`i = 1), (5.3)
 `u = Pr(d
`
u,i = 0|y`i = 0), (5.4)
where i(1  i  n) refers to each app, u(1  u  m) refers to each user, and `(1 
`  r) refers to each label. Parameter ↵ = [↵`u],   = [ `u] can be learned from training data
using EM algorithm according to Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) and y`i is then
computed via Bayesian rules.
According to the maximum likelihood principle, this approach maximizes the following
objective function: J(✓,y) = max✓,y
h
ln Pr([du,i]|✓,y) + lnPr(✓)
i
, where ✓ = {↵,  } is
the parameters as in Eqs.(5.3, 5.4), where ↵ denotes the probability that a user will assign
security label to a user review under the condition that the label is positive, and   denotes
the probability that a user will not assign security label to a user review under the condition
that the label is negative.
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After a few steps of derivation via EM algorithm (see details in Appendix), finally,







i = 1|✓) + b`i Pr(y`i = 0|✓)
, (5.5)
















and Pr(y`i = 1|✓) is the prior probability for app i with label `, and Pr(y`i = 1|✓) =
1  Pr(y`i = 0|✓).
5.6.3 Determination App-level Behavior via y`i
However, the probability value y`i is not directly useful for determination of app-level
behavior. Notice that, although we utilize crowdsourcing algorithm to aggregate review-
level labels to app-level labels, the review level labels are not really user annotation, but
from auto annotation with a trained classifier (in Section 5.2). The review given by users
are not originally annotations for our security issues. Therefore, the prior probability of
finding a user review mentioning one of the four security issues (in Table 5.1) is quite low,
even given the fact that the security issues exist for the app. This is easy to understand since
the user may not actually encounter the security issue when using the app, and may not give
a review after encountering the issue, or the review level classifier failed to recognize the
semantic meaning in the review. As a result, the probability value of y`i may not be taken
as the probability of the app having the security issues, but more as a security-risk ranking
score for comparing the security risk of the app having the issues against others.
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In order to get a clear output for whether the app has the security behavior or not, a
threshold need to be tuned for each label to provide the binary prediction. This threshold
can be determined through active manual annotation, which is discussed in Section 5.7.
5.7 Experiment
In this section, we present the experiment result computed using AUTORBF. AU-
TORBF aims to bridge the gap between users’ understanding of apps and what the apps’
behavior really is. To evaluate the effectiveness of AUTORBF, we compare the behavior
inferred at both review-level and app-level against the app behavior labeled by human be-
ing. we make a quantitative study on the performance of the system. More specifically, we
design our experiment and answer the following two questions:
• RQ1: What is prediction performance using review-level security behavior inference
model?
• RQ2: Can we get the app-level security behavior annotation result via crowdsourc-
ing? What is the credibility of different users? Will users report the security prob-
lems?
Towards this goal, we first crawled the user-review dataset from Google Play via re-
verse engineering the service protocol. Then, using the crawled dataset, we evaluate the
performance of our approach on review-level and app-level1.
5.7.1 Data Collection
We collected our dataset from Google Play. On Google Play, a user’s reviews about
apps that he/she used are publicly available. Once we obtain the Google ID of a user, we
can locate all apps the user has reviewed. Therefore, we can obtain a list of Google user IDs
and write a crawler to retrieve all rated apps of these users. Moreover, for each retrieved
app, we crawled its reviews from Google Play. The crawler was written in python.
1To encourage this line of research, we plan to make our dataset publicly available soon.
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We evaluate the performance of review-level app behavior inference problem on one
dataset collected during November 2013, containing 19, 413 user reviews from 3, 174 apps
from Google play. This dataset is annotated manually by two graduate professionals in two
months. Each user review is given a label by two annotators. If the two annotators reach
a consensus, the user review is labeled as a specific label. Otherwise, the two annotators
will discuss and reach a consensus on the controversial user reviews. Each user review was
labeled with either one (or several) of the four labels described in Table. 5.1, or none of the
above four labels. The annotation was conducted with expectation to respect the meaning
of the reviews themselves rather than the actual app behaviors. We refer this dataset as L
since it is manually labeled by human being. The statistics of datasetL is listed in Table. 5.2
Table 5.2.: L Dataset details to validate the review-level security behaviors. The Mean, Max and
Min are statistics for the number of reviews for per app. The mean number of review per app is
small because we already filtered out those review with over 3 ratings, which are the majority of
them.
Dataset #app #Review Mean Max Min
L 3,174 19,143 6 4,500 1
Moreover, we collect another data to validate the effectiveness of our approach on app-
level security behavior inference problem. This dataset is collected through December 2013
to May 2014, containing 12, 783 apps with 13, 129, 783 reviews from 2, 614, 186 users.
However, this dataset shares no intersection with the apps in dataset L. We refer to this
dataset as dataset D. However, for this dataset, we did not hire enough labor to manually
label this dataset, and get the ground truth of security behaviors with respect to each app.
The good thing is that we can directly use this dataset to compare the differences between
the results of code analysis and review analysis. Table 5.3 summarizes the basic statistics
of this dataset. In addition, Fig. 3.1(a) shows the distribution of number of apps over the
number of reviews we get and the distribution of apps over the 5 rating values from the
reviews. Note that, the peak at 4000 is artificial, due to the fact that our crawler is set to
only crawl the first 4, 000 reviews for each app. It is clear that most users tend to give high
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ratings to the apps once they decide to give the reviews. This, however, also means that
most of the reviews are not valuable for our purpose of detecting security issues.
Table 5.3.: D Dataset details to validate the app-level security behaviors. The Mean, Max and Min
are statistics for the number of reviews for per app. The max number of reviews (4, 000) is artificial,
because our web crawler is set to crawl only the first 4000 reviews for each app.
Dataset #app #Comment #User Mean Max Min
D 12,783 13,129,783 2,614,186 1,027 4,000 1
We next describe our evaluation results to demonstrate the effectiveness of AUTORBF
in identifying review-level and app-level security behaviors.
5.7.2 RQ1: Review-level Security-behavior Inference
To answer RQ1, we quantify the effectiveness of AUTORBF on review-level security
behavior inference.
Experiment setting
The evaluation of the proposed review-level classification is conducted on annotated
dataset L. As a supervised method, a training set is required for training the model. The
whole dataset set is randomly split in a 50%/50% manner into a training set with 10, 893
reviews and a testing set with 8, 520 reviews. This splitting is based on app-level, so the
reviews for the same app can only be in training or testing set altogether and the number of
reviews in the two sets are not even.
In solving the optimization problem for security behavior inference, a five-fold cross
validation method is adopted for finding the best ↵s in training set. For semantic expansion,
TF-IDF features with cosine similarity is adopted for the retrieval model and Lemur2 is
used as the actual tool for the word retrieval. Time constraint is enforced to prevent review
expansion with “future relevant” reviews. The indexes of retrieval model are built for the
two sets separately so that the model parameter like document number and IDF values will
not interfere between sets. The mixture ratio ↵ and the size of “relevant” document set R
2http://www.lemurproject.org/
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for the expansion are fixed by using five-fold cross validation in training set for each label
along with the scope. The size of R is selected from {1, 3, 5, 10}.
Evaluation Measurement The metric used for evaluation is precision, recall and F1 value.
Let the number of true positives, false positives, true negatives, and false negatives be TP ,
FP , TN and FN , respectively w.r.t. a classifier. TP indicates that AUTORBF correctly
labels the review as a security issue if the review is. FP indicates that AUTORBF incor-
rectly labels a review as a security issue if the review is not. TN indicates that AUTORBF
correctly labels a review as a non-security issue if the review is not. FN indicates that
AUTORBF incorrectly labels a review as a non-security issue if the review is.
The precision metric is defined as Precision = TPTP+FP , and the recall metric is Recall =
TP
TP+FN . The F1 measure is the harmonic mean of precision and recall, i.e., F1 =
2TP
2TP+FP+FN ,
and accuracy is, Accuracy = TP+TNTP+FP+TN+FN . Larger values of these metrics suggest bet-
ter classification results. Thus the values of these metrics indicate how well the security
behavior inference result matches with the human annotated result.
Experiment result analysis
Table. 5.4 shows the performance of our method in identifying different categories of
security issues. The results indicate that, out of 8,520 reviews, AUTORBF effectively
labels the security-related behaviors with the average precision, recall, F1 score, accu-
racy of 80.10%, 82.46%, 81.26%, 94.05%. After carefully looking at different categories
of security-related behaviors, we find that AUTORBF can identify “spamming”, “over-
claimed permission” and “data leakage” issues at the average precision of 83.84%, 78.25%,
77.97%, respectively, and at the average accuracy of 91.96%, 95.99%, 93.46%, respec-
tively. This confirms the effectiveness of using semantic expansion approach and advanced
machine learning classifier in AUTORBF.
An exceptional case is the detection of security issues related to “finance”, the precision
of which is not as high as the above three categories. When we check the users’ reviews,
we find that the false positives and false negatives are higher than those computed from
other security categories. We find that many users actually do not complain the “financial
issue”, but their reviews are labeled as “financial issues”. Also, some users complain the
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“financial issues” without using any words related to “buy, purchase, pay, paid, etc”, which
misleads AUTORBF in making a wrong decision.
Comparisons against the key-words based approach
For comparison purpose, we also apply key-words based approach as a baseline to show
the necessity of using the proposed semantic expansion techniques and advanced machine
learning method used in AUTORBF. A number of key-words are manually selected for
each security label as sampled in Table 5.6, and this approach predicts all reviews that
contain at least one of the key-words to be positive for the underlining label. Note that,
these keywords are stemmed 3 in pre-processing, so that the words from same origin may
be matched to each other. Follow the same evaluation measurement used in AUTORBF,
we compute TP, FP, FN, TN, Precision, Recall, F1, Accuracy, and summarize the results in
Table 5.5.
We then compute the performance improvement in using AUTORBF against the key-
word based approach. Let OPrecision,Orecall,OF1,OACC be performance difference be-
tween our approach and key-word based approach. Table 5.7 shows the comparisons of dif-
ference in identifying security issues between AUTORBF and key-word based approach.
For all four categories and overall performance, AUTORBF gains significant performance
improvement in terms of precision, F1 and Accuracy. We observed that the recall of our ap-
proach is generally lower than key-word based approach because our approach has higher
false negatives. However, the key-word approach has extremely high false positives since
many user reviews that include sensitive words do not necessarily cause security-related is-
sues. Considering the tradeoff between the precision and recall, our approach outperforms
key-word based approach significantly, i.e., an average of 46.48% performance improve-
ment in terms of F1, and an average of 51.36% performance gain in terms of accuracy.
3http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stemming
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5.7.3 RQ2: app-level Security Behavior Inference
Now we are ready to present our analysis result in terms of different security issues on
app-level.
Experiment setting
Based on the trained classifier from the review level experiment, e.g., the classifiers
evaluated in Table 5.4, all reviews in dataset D are automatically annotated with the four
labels. We apply the crowdsourcing algorithm introduced in Sec 5.6 to generate app level
resultY for each app in D, while evaluating the user credibility of the users in D.
Experiment Results
In order to determine the thresholds for the four label, we labeled about 50 apps for each
label and tuned the thresholds to best classify those labeled apps. These apps are randomly
selected from those apps that have (y`i ) at the range of [mean(y`i )   std(y`i ),mean(y`i ) +
std(y`i )], where mean(y`i ) is the average values of y`i , and std(y`i ) is the standard deviation
of y`i .
In this way, we get all the security labels for each app at app-level. For example,
CallToPark is a web app that aims to make personal payment and account management
faster. y`i values computed from crowsourcing approach (Sec 5.6) is:
[0; 0.997; 0.002; 0.003],
corresponding to four categories of security issues of spamming, financial, over-claimed
permission and data leakage. The results indicate it has 3 security issues (i.e., financial,
over-claimed permission and data leakage) out of four. The serious degrees of security
issues are reflected by these numbers. The greater numbers indicate the more serious secu-
rity issues from user perspective, such as more complains and dissatisfaction. Due to space
limit, we did not show more quantitative results with respect to each app.
Analysis of user credibility
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A by-product of crowdsourcing in AUTORBF is the learned parameters for each user,
indicating how reliable the user’s reviews are in our system. Figs. 5.4, 5.5 show the distri-
bution of the number of users based on the trained parameters.
The distribution of number of users over the learned ↵ values shows three peaks (Fig. 5.4).
The middle peak is around 0.5 which is the manually set prior value. In fact, this peak
is the expectation of the distribution, indicating the behavior of majority users.
The lower peak shows the users that are less likely to report the issues in reviews, hence
are given less credibility, therefore contribute less in the crowdsourcing process. These
users may be more focusing on the functionality and attractiveness over the security issues
of the app, or they simply do not want to pay the effort of reporting the issues.
The higher peak shows the users that are much more likely to report a security issue.
They are considered as experts and their reviews are considered with high weights in the
crowdsourcing process. These users are sensitive to those four security issues and are more
willing to report them once they found them.
The distribution of user over the learned   values (Fig. 5.5) shows not much informa-
tion, compared to the one for ↵. Although ↵ and   looks symmetric in Eqs.(5.3, 5.4),
they are in fact quite different in data. Users are not obligated to report security issues in
reviews, and their default behavior is to report nothing. Therefore,  , as the value of the
probability of report nothing when the app do not have the issues, has a very high expecta-
tion with lower variance. As a result, the distribution for   has a clear tendency towards 1,
and the three peaks are less obvious than ↵ (note that the number of users is in log scale,
the peak near 1 is actually much more significant).
It is worth noting that, the parameters are learned based mainly on how well the users’
opinions match the majority. It does not reveal the exact reason why the credibility is low
for some user. So we are not considering those users with low credibility as fraud users, it
is just that their opinions carry less value for these four underlining security problems and
it is perfectly fine for users not reporting any of the issues in reviews.
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Figure 5.4.: Distribution of learned ↵ parameters for number of users in log scale.
Figure 5.5.: Distribution of learned   parameters for number of users in log scale.
This also shows the reason why we use the so-called two-coin crowdsoucing model
instead of the simple majority voting in crowdsourcing precess. With the distinguishing of
different types of users, the app level result would be much more reliable.
5.8 Behavior Gap between AUTORBF and Code Analysis
The analysis results from user reviews reflect users’ understanding and perception of
security issues. Different users have exhibited different security concerns depending on
personal preference. In the app-level crowdsoucing results, we can get the crowdsourcing
results for each app. For each app, based on the statistics from different users, one can see
how many users have complained one security concern, and how many users never mind or
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simply do not notice the security concern. And it is hard to say which user is right or which
user is wrong. We can only say different users have different preference to report different
security concerns.
The results from both static analysis (e.g., [14] [7] [75] [76]) and dynamic analysis
(e.g., [77] [78] [79] [80] ) can reflect the code inherent structures and behaviors objec-
tively, although sometimes incomplete, due to the inherent limitations of static analysis
and dynamic analysis (e.g., undecidability of static analysis, non- coverage characteristic
of dynamic analysis, etc). However, it is not enough to reflect how users’ real security con-
cerns during using the app. Generally, users have different psychological expectations for
different apps, and do not necessarily worry about the same security issue [73]. Our study
provides the quantitative study result to understand the security concerns of different users,
and also the credibility of users. The security issue inferred at app-level via crowdsourcing
reflects the psychological needs of users, and is really something that users are worried
about.
Thus, in our evaluation, we first make a comparative analysis of the “subjective” re-
sults from user behavior inference via crowdsourcing, against the objective results from
code analysis. After that we analyze why these differences exist using case study. In the
following, we will analyze four categories of security behaviors one by one.
5.8.1 Spamming
Spamming here refers to both foreground and background ads and spamming behaviors,
including Ads in notification bar, ads via email, ads via SMS, Pop-up ads, Fishing, etc. Ads
libraries in Android ecosystem offer developers solutions for monetizing the apps by dis-
playing ads to users. Over half of the apps in Google play include an ad or ads library [14].
The ads libraries communicate with the ads network to get and show proper ads, based on
the app context and personalized user information (such as location, context, etc). Many
ads libraries collect users’ personal information, by which they do target ads, which results
in serious security concerns.
110
Most (if not all) of the users dislike advertising practices, although some users may not
realize that ads cause security risks. In AUTORBF, we infer the ads spamming behavior
from the users’ reviews.
From code analysis view, different mobile apps embed different ads libraries. We use
the methods proposed in [89] as a guideline to implement our own analysis tool to extract
the ads-library used in a mobile app. We first manually investigate the usages of the most
popular 100 ads libraries [89] to identify the usage signatures of each ads library in a
mobile app, and then we automatically extract the list of ads libraries used by a mobile app
by searching the decompiled code of the app using signature matching. Through this, we
can get a list of ads library used by each app.
We compare the results of “spamming analysis” from running ads library analysis tool
and AUTORBF on apps in datasetD, while on 67.5% apps, ads analysis indicates that the
app uses ads and AUTORBF agrees, on 32.5% apps, ads analysis indicates that the app
uses ads but AUTORBF disagrees. This implies that the set of the app that has “spamming
” security issues AUTORBF detected is only a subset of that of ads library analysis.
Further, we make a case study on two specific apps.
  Example 1: Pandora internet radio
Pandora is a free, personalized radio that allows users to play music that he/she loves,
and helps users to discover new music and enjoy old favorite songs, artist, composer, etc.
In this example, ads analysis indicates the app Pandora uses ads, and the AUTORBF
agree. Many reviews have claimed there are too many ads! From the review-level and
app-level analysis results, we can easily verify it. For example, one reviewer’s review1
“Too many annoying ads I may not have noticed the ads as much if they didn’t play the same 3
irritating ads every 3-5 songs. Switching to iHeartRadio’s much much better ad-to-song ratio.”
  Example 2: Yelp
The free Yelpmobile app is one of the most popular apps that search for business (e.g.,
restaurant, bars, coffee, teas, etc) around you. When we do ads analysis, the result indicates
that Yelp uses the ads library com.google.ads. However, AUTORBF disagrees.
1Due to privacy reason, we omit the name of the review.
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Most of the users give very high-recommendation for this app, and it has an overall score
of 4.3. An example of review is shown below.
“Yelp is the best Before going ANYwhere, I first check it out on yelp. Nail salons, restaurants,
coffee shops, liquor stores, anything! I trust my fellow yelpers to give me the honest truth, and that’s
why yelp is the best. Plus the app makes it incredibly easy to get directions, write a review, and find
out what’s good in your area all from your phone!”
Very interestingly, almost none users complain the “spamming” issue especially ads for
Yelp. Yelp itself can be viewed as a “spmming ads”, which always helps you to discover
great local businesses, and search for nearby restaurants, shops, services, etc. It is natural
that no users will take it as an ad.
F Lessons Learned Given the ads library used by apps, why user complains about
some apps but not others? The ads detection task defined in ads analysis from code analysis
perspective may not comply with what users really feel about the ads.
5.8.2 Financial Issue
There are external issues that bother users’ experience and cause security concerns that
are beyond the running app in users’ device. These issues mainly involve the web services
used by the running apps to facilitate their functionalities. In this paper, we focus on one
type of external issues that may cause financial problems to users. We define the financial
issues as those complains about In-App-Purchase (IAP), free app to premium update and
others that cause the users actual money lost in external context other than the running apps.
For example, user may pay for IAP or upgrade but get nothing as described, a bank app
may transfer money for user but only deduction happened without deposit. There issues
may caused by program bugs but also by intentional fraud. Therefore it would be quite
important that we can find a way to detect them.
From code analysis perceptive, there is almost no way to clearly detect the financial
issue even if your account information is sent out of the phone. We are aware that flow
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and dynamic analysis (e.g., taintdroid [79], flowdroid [83], droidbox1, etc) can potentially
detect the users’ banking account information going out of the phone through taint analysis
and running the app in a virtual controlled environment. However, even if users’ account
information is leaked, we cannot say that financial issue really happens. In contrast, based
on user review analysis, we can get evidence/clues of how financial problems occurred.
Examples related to IAP and free to premium are shown below.
  Example 1: Cases for IAP
“I baught $2.00 in papaya’s and I never got them. In really mad about it. I’ve spent a lot of
money on this game. If I get what I paid for I will retract my statement but until then no”
“I paid for the year subscription and a week later I was getting notifications that my subscription
was almost up. And a few days the app stopped working. So I emailed the developer to fix this and
he never got back to me. So now I wasted my money on this app I can’t even use. This is staying a
one star until it’s fixed.”
“My weapons that I purchased have dissapeared. I payed real money! ”
“I use to love this game ...having been playing it for years but recently I started purchasing coins
with my credit card and never received them but I call and check my balance and the money has
been deducted from my account....thieves ”
  Example 2: Cases for free to premium
“So angry!! Paid for this app and it hardly worked for the 1st day then the second day it stopped
working completely!! The developer wont reply to my emails so basically my money has been
stolen by this developer!! Btw the free version of this works fine as soon as you buy it boom it stops
working!!! Think the developer is trying to take the Mick of people who buy this!!”
“Paid for the premium one but was unable to download videos. Very upset as money wasted.”
F Lessons Learned Running app is only part of the user experience, which may be
partially or fully investigated by code analysis (including static flow analysis and dynamic
analysis). However, there exits environmental or external factors that matters too. For
those factors, user review serves as a better and more complete source for analysis. For the
security behavior related to app environment, it cannot be inferred from code analysis. We
1https://code.google.com/p/droidbox/
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believe there are also other external issues that are only detectable from user reviews but
not code analysis. Due to space limit, we did not show more examples here.
5.8.3 Over-claimed Permission
In Android system, there are more than 170 permission which are request by users
to access the phone hardware, settings, user data like location, contact, photos, account,
etc. More permission than expectation here refers to the app request more permission than
users’ expectation. It has subtle difference from the “over-claimed permission”. When
we say “over-claimed” permission, it indicates that the app requests more permission as
compared to the permissions that are actually used during the running of the apps, which
is from app developers’ perspective. What we mean, however, is from users’ expectation
perspective. As long as users do not think that the app requests more permissions than
his/her expectation, we believe that this app does not request too much permission.
From code analysis view, we can get the truly called permissions by an app through
static analysis. Specifically, we firstly decompile the apk files of a mobile app and obtain
the function call graph (FCG) of the app. Then we traverse the function call graph (FCG)
to trace any functional call that invokes permission check. By doing so, we are able to
obtain the real permission that is used in an app. More details about how to identify used
permission in a mobile app can be found in [4].
We compare the results of “more permission than users’ expectation” from running
AUTORBF on apps in dataset D, against the “over-claimed” permission by running static
analysis tools on mobile apps, while on 58.5% apps, code analysis indicates the app has
over-claimed permission and AUTORBF agrees the app requests “more permissions than
users’ expectation”; and on 41.5% apps, code analysis indicates the app has over-claimed
permission but AUTORBF disagrees that the app request “more permission than users’
expectation”. The numerical value further implies that the two goals are not aligned.
  Example 1: Angry Birds
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The free Angry Birds mobile app is a video game franchise created by Finnish
computer game developer Rovio Entertainment, and is called “one of the most mainstream
games out right now”1. When we do code analysis, the result indicates that the permission
location is not necessarily needed in function calls. However, in AUTORBF result, al-
most no users complain that it requests too more permission than expectation. An example
of review is shown below.
“Excellent Game I enjoy playing this awesome game as it’s cool with good graphics and back-
ground sound but ads videos anoying me. Also sometimes I feel boring whenever I have to replay
again and again to cross the levels. Overall, it is exciting game......”
  Example 2: dictionary
The free dictionary.com mobile app is the top 1 fee English dictionary app since
2010 with over 2,000,000 definitions and synonyms. When we do code analysis, the re-
sult indicates that the permission location is really accessed in FCG. However, from
user’s perspective, there is no need to access location for an online/offline dictionary. In
AUTORBF result, some users complain it requests users’ location and media file
resources. An example of review is shown below.
“Too much information Why do you need my location and media files? Access to the internet
I understand but this is ridiculous! My pictures and my mic are an invasion of privacy, especially
since this is a DICTIONARY!!”
F Lessons Learned Whether the permission is over-claimed depends highly on what
the expectation the users have on the app. Code analysis (including static analysis and
dynamic analysis) may not be able to grab the expectation, from the users’ mental needs.
5.8.4 Data leakage
“Data leakage” refers to access sensitive information without user acknowledgement.




without asking for users’ consent, such that users’ personal information are already sent out
of the phone.
From code analysis view, we can get the truly accessed resources by each app from
static analysis on the flow of app (e.g., flowdroid [83]) or dynamic analysis (e.g., taint-
droid [79], etc) to capture the running time behaviors. Specifically, we run the dynamic
analysis tool to analyze the dynamic behaviors of mobile apps, which emulates the actions
of user interaction, incoming calls, SMS messages, I/O file read/write, network operations,
telephone records (such as IMEI,IMSI, MSISDN, etc). By doing so, we are able to obtain
the resources that the app accessed during running.
We compare the results of “data leakage” from running AUTORBF on apps in dataset
D, against “access sensitive personal data via network traffic. file writes, and SMS texts”
by running the dynamic analysis tool; while on 73.5% apps, code analysis indicates the app
has accessed sensitive personal data and AUTORBF agrees that the app requests “access
sensitive data” and on 26.5% apps, code analysis indicates the app accesses sensitive data
but AUTORBF do not.
  Example 1: Accuweather
The free Accuweather mobile app is one of the leading minute-by-minute weather
forecast, and the weather report can be localized to your exact street address. When we do
code analysis, the result indicates that it accesses photos/media/file, and has the potential
of file read/write activity on devices, resulting in “data leakage” behaviors. However, in
AUTORBF result, most (if not all) of the users have very high recommendation for this
app, and does not classify it as “data leakage”. From users’ perspective, most of the users
trust it. An example of review is shown below.
“Reliable 100% and accurate 85%, Why? (read comment below) Therefore I rate this app
100% to anyone, one tiny problem it cannot find my location with is ST FRANFIS BAY Eastern
Cape South Africa! It can find cape st Francis but that about 10/15min away! ”
  Example 2: Aroundme
The free Aroundmemobile app is an app which consistently shows you a complete list
of all the businesses such as nearest bank, bar, gas station, hospital, hotel, movie theatre,
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restaurant, etc. When we do code analysis, the result indicates that it accesses many per-
sonal data, such as location, photos/media/files, and these information are probably sent out
of the phone. In AUTORBF result, it labels aroundme as “data leakage”, because from
user’s perspective, it consistently requests some resources such as location. An example of
review is shown below.
“ Always search for current location ... Though GPS on this app prompts for setting. I hate
this nonsense bull sheet app. 2ndly When change the units still it shows yards ... Works crazy with
Android... ”
F Lessons Learned We can find whether the app accessed the users’ personal data,
e.g., location, account, contact, etc through code analysis. However, we do not know
whether the users feel comfortable if their personal information are accessed, and even sent
to the third-party. From users’ perspective, AUTORBF can capture users’ expectation and
psychological needs.
5.8.5 Summary & Insight
Although deep analysis from code perspective can be applied before the apps are put
into the app store, user reviews are more like an update of the previous security analysis
on the app. It is an important complementary analysis to previous analysis of app such as
static and dynamic analysis due to the fact that:
• The user reviews reveal how the users feel about the experience, but not what really
happened. Users’ expectation plays a big role on how much the users can tolerate the
apps’ behavior, as show in the case of different apps likes aroundme, angrybird,
dictionary, yelp, etc. Similar app behaviors may receive different responses
from users.
• External factors of the app-using behavior are much easier revealed by user reviews.
• Privacy issues are relative and personal. The borderlines between privacy-intruding
and tolerable misbehavior are fuzzy and depend highly on users’ subjective expecta-
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tions. Hence user review may provide an important complementary source for deter-
mining the threshold based on the objective app behavior revealed by code analysis.
5.9 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose the system AUTORBF that understands the review-to-behavior
fidelity in Android apps, i.e., it can infer the mobile app security related behaviors from the
apps’ reviews from different users via crowdsourcing. Our novel learning-based algorithm
and advanced crowdsourcing techniques are able to mine the relationships between user
reviews and app security behaviors. To our knowledge, AUTORBF is the first work that
has the capability to accurately detect the apps’ security behaviors from user reviews. In in-
ferring four categories of security related behaviors from user reviews, our system achieves
the average accuracy as high as 94.05%. We also get credibility for different users at app-
level behavior prediction. Our study provides valuable insights and quantitative analysis in












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5.6.: Sampled key-words used in “Key-word based approach”.
Label key-words
spamming ad, spam, notif, advertis, ad-
vert, spammi, add, money, se-
cur, push, etc
Financial text, deduct, sm, bought,
paid, took, privat, txt, taken,
charg, purchas, etc
Over-claimed Permission permiss, access, money, read,
info, privaci, regist, camera,
need, want, contact, requir,
ask, locat, data, internet, re-
quest, credit, email, call, nec-
essari, etc
Data leakage permiss, privaci, info, hack,
access, contact, money,
fool, lie, id, ground, inform,
lockscreen, steal, wit, wall,
camera, data, requir, phish,
internet, licenc, locat, etc
Table 5.7.: Performance difference between our approach and key-word based approach. O indi-
cates the performance difference in terms of different metrics.
Label OPrecision O Recall OF1 OACC
spamming 50.74%  7.39% 38.18% 57.70%
Financial 50.98%  36.68% 36.71% 33.93%
Over-claimed
Permission
67.74%  27.43% 55.93% 66.61%
Data leakage 57.27%  15.53% 43.95% 47.17%
Average 68.94%  15.14% 46.48% 51.36%
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6 SUMMARY
The works of this dissertation is motivated to explore new ways in managing the security
and privacy issues in the thriving Android platform. With machine learning as our weapon,
we conducted a series of data-driven researches on different Android app related security
issues. These researches approach from two directions: direct analysis of the Android app
and indirect analysis from user comments.
6.1 Direct Analysis
Our direct analysis approach focus on malicious app detection and propose to use prob-
abilistic discriminative model to improve the performance and decompiled source code of
the app as information source. This results in a over 95% F1 score and is a huge improve-
ment from previous work.
The limitation of this work comes from several aspect.
• Data-driven means the performance relies on the training data. Although this ap-
proach use function name occurrence as feature and would be more robust on mali-
cious code variants than exact code piece signature based methods, it will not guar-
antee to response to new threat until retraining.
• This is a static analysis, so it will not defend against runtime change of code logic by
the Reflection feature in Java and the alike. This technique is best used for screening




Our indirect analysis approach makes use of the user comments to extract relevant top-
ics, then evaluate the app based on that. This is a new line of work that has not been
explored yet. We collected user comment dataset and did annotation with a designed label
set with consideration of both the scenario and the nature of the security issues. A topic
extraction method is provided to extract security topics regarding the labels from use com-
ments. Then the topics of each comments are used in evaluating the apps’ security risk.
By treating these extracted topics as user annotation to the app, we applied crowdsourc-
ing technique to accumulate topics from user comment level to app level while estimate
user credibility in commenting apps with respect to different security topics. Finally, we
evaluate the apps’ security risk by a learning to rank process, leveraging app level security
topics and features. Moreover, in order to improve the performance, we developed a joint
optimization method to jointly train both the crowdsourcing and learning to rank model
and get about 7% improvement in terms nDCG metric.
Further effort are done to compare the user comment based indirect analysis to tradi-
tional code analysis based direct analysis on multiple security issues of Android apps. We
confirmed that the new user comment based indirect analysis would be a necessary compli-
mentary means in solving Android app security issues due to the following observations:
• User comment based method may cover some issues that direct code analysis may
not or are hard to deal with. For example the IAP issue that is heavily related to
server side behavior other than apps on the smart phone.
• User expectation plays a important role in mobile app privacy issues. Whether an app
is using Ads abusively or whether a permission should be granted, these questions
are not just technical issues but also very much depend on user expectations of the
underlining app. And user comment based analysis may shed some light on what
user expect from the apps.
• Objectives misalignment between code analysis and user comment based analysis.
For example, in the case of over-claimed permission issue, it is natural for code
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analysis to set task to find mismatch between the permissions claimed and the per-
missions in use. But from the users’ perspective, one may argue that claim an unnec-
essary permission is bad, actually using it is worse. The “over-claimed” may mean
the mismatch between the claimed permission and the user expectation of the app.
As a new direction of work, limitations are inevitable but also point out future direc-
tions.
• Comment spamming remains a problem for user comment based analysis. Unreliable
user comments render all analysis built upon them untrustworthy. Therefore it would
be necessary to explore user credibility from user intention perspective (anti-spam)
instead of user ability. Making use of meta-data of the comment posting activity may
be greatly helpful in identifying spam user and separate their comments from the
evaluation of the app. Based on experience from other anti-spam works (email spam,
Twitter spam, etc.), this seems to be a start.
• Our current auto labelling method has not been using the most state-of-the-art Natural
Language Processing (NLP) technique for identifying user opinion. By incorporating
some well studied NLP method, the performance of user comment labelling could be
improved, hence improving the evaluation of the apps’ security.
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